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ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR
IN INVESTMENT BANKING

Elzotbek Rustambekov, Doctor of Philosophy, 2012
Old Dominion University, 2012
Dissertation Directed by: Dr. Anil Nair,
Dr. Michael McShane and Dr. David Selover.
Department o f Management
College of Business and Public Administration

This dissertation examines corporate risk-taking behavior by investment banks in
the United States. This study was sparked by the collapse o f Lehman Brothers, one of
the largest bankruptcy filings in U.S. history. This dissertation examines the specific
factors that drove investment banks such as Lehman Brothers to take excessive risks, and
how the deregulation of the US financial services industry towards the end of the 1990s
contributed to risk-taking behavior.
I use four theoretical perspectives to examine corporate risk-taking behavior
among investment banks. These perspectives include: institutional theory, behavioral
theory o f the firm, knowledge based view (KBV) o f the firm, and agency theory. Risk
research in strategic management has mostly tended to adopt three theoretical
perspectives: behavioral theory o f the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). I included
institutional theory and KBV perspectives because numerous studies suggest that the
regulatory environment (Scott, 2003) and knowledge base of a firm (Grant, 1996b)

matters in corporate risk-taking. A review o f the practitioner literature also suggests that
regulatory frameworks and lack of firm competence have played a role in firm risk-taking
behavior (Pirson & Turnbull, 2011; Summers, 2011; Wallison, 2011).
My analysis suggests that both external and internal factors were associated with
excessive corporate risk-taking among investment banks. External factors associated with
firm risk-taking include the institutional environment, such as regulation (or absence
thereof). Internal factors associated with firm risk-taking include aspirations of
executives, level o f corporate diversification, knowledge base of company, number of
interlocking directorships in the board, size o f the board, ratio of insiders to outsiders on
the board, and ownership o f the stock by board members of investment banks.
The findings o f this study contribute to the literature on corporate risk-taking
behavior, and suggest that the study of such a complex phenomenon as corporate-risk
taking needs to be done using multiple theoretical perspectives.

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother for all her support
and for instilling in me that learning is truly a lifelong process.
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A STUDY OF RISK BEHAVIOR
IN INVESTMENT BANKING

1 INTRODUCTION

This dissertation analyzes the antecedents of corporate risk-taking and answers
the question: what factors contribute to corporate risk-taking? Specifically it looks at how
four sets o f factors, including: (1) institutional and industry variables, (2) company’s
aspirations, (3) firm’s knowledge, and (4) corporate governance, contribute to corporate
risk-taking (Please see Appendix A). It is established in the literature that all four sets of
factors influence corporate risk-taking, yet there is no study that analyzes these factors at
once and shows which factors have a stronger effect on risk strategies. While considering
all four sets o f factors, this dissertation analyzes competing theoretical perspectives on
risk, including institutional theory, knowledge-based view, behavioral theory of the firm
and agency theory. In the face of the current financial crisis, the importance o f corporate
risk-taking cannot be overstated; one o f the main implications of this research is that any
analysis o f corporate risk-taking should be performed on a holistic manner using
multilayered levels of analysis.
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Corporate risk embodies a multitude of policy decisions that are made separately
as a

reaction to different industry and firm factors that have unbalanced effects on

corporate performance, and possibly, corporate survival (Reger, Duhaime, & Stimpert,
1992). Institutional variables include presence or absence o f various regulations as well
as the number o f agencies overlooking particular sectors of the economy, and it is
established that changes in regulations result in change in corporate risk levels (Wiseman
& Catanach Jr, 1997).

The connection between regulations and corporate risk was

established not only in the United States, but across the world, including in Central and
Eastern European countries (Agoraki, Delis, & Pasiouras, 2009). Regulations such as
capital requirements, bank activity restrictions, and boundaries o f supervisory power
have an independent influence on risk-taking in the banking sector, and that influence is
separate from any market power effects of regulatory changes (Agoraki et al., 2009).
Therefore, institutional environment clearly influences corporate risk-taking, and that is
why it is selected as one of the main factors in the analysis.

The behavioral theory of the firm combines companies’ aspirations, performance
levels and corporate risk (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963). When performance
levels exceed aspirations, companies keep their established routines, as there is no need
to change the system that performs well (Augier & Prietula, 2007). Otherwise, when
performance levels fall below aspirations, companies search for new ways to operate,
because what they are doing is not working (Augier & Prietula, 2007). The difference
between aspirations and actual performance is called attainment discrepancy (Lant,
1992). The higher this discrepancy is, the larger the company’s pressure to take risk
(Bromiley, 1991). Aspirations can be measured in two ways: (1) as company’s past
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performance, and (2) as company’s peer groups’ performance (Cyert & March, 1963),
and both o f those will be measured in this dissertation.

The resource-based view

argues that a valuable, rare,

inimitable

and

nonsubstitutable set of resources provides a sustained competitive advantage for a
company (Barney, 1986b, 1991, 2001).

Resources not only provide competitive

advantage, but also influence corporate risk-taking (Wang, Barney, & Reuer, 2003). In
turn, particular corporate risk-taking practices send a positive signal to the market and
can attract more resources in the form o f investment to the company (Wang et al., 2003).
Corporate resources consist o f various productive systems, including physical capital,
legal capital, intangible assets and human talent (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). In human
talent Mahoney and Pandian (1992) include top management teams as a crucial resource
that generates rent. Das and Teng (1998) divided resources into four categories,
including: financial, technological, physical and managerial, and showed an interactive
effect o f resources with risk (Das & Teng, 1998). Managerial resources include
knowledge and expertise, and they will be analyzed using knowledge-based view o f the
firm, which is an extension of resource-based view (Felin & Hesterly, 2007). Knowledgebased view argues that the key to any company’s success lies in its ability to integrate
various types o f knowledge and apply it to new problems, products and services (Grant,
1996b). Knowledge-based view puts forward the idea that a company’s success and
survival depend on its ability to combine, generate and apply relevant knowledge
(Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1993, 1996). Hierarchical organizations are
particularly good at combining, sorting and applying knowledge, thus developing “path
dependent” capabilities and intellectual assets (Athanassiades, 1973).

The relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk-taking is well
established (Eling & Marek, 2011; John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008). Variations o f corporate
governance systems across countries, like the market-based corporate governance system
of the U.K. and the control-based corporate governance system o f Germany, produce
variations in corporate risk-taking, and evidence of this is well established (Eling &
Marek, 2011). Corporate risk-taking choices are partly determined by managers’ explicit
ownership o f a company and various compensation schemes, such as stock-ownership,
by top management teams (John et al., 2008). Other things that determine corporate risktaking are board members’ behavior, access to relevant information and ability to process
knowledge (Pirson & Turnbull, 2011) as well as presence and scope o f responsibilities of
audit and risk management committees (Brown, Steen, & Foreman, 2009). All this
evidence suggests that differences in corporate governance systems between companies
and across nations clearly influence corporate risk-taking. In this dissertation, additional
factors such as interlocking directorships and the number o f independent directors on the
board will be examined.

Four

sets

of

factors

contribute

to

corporate

risk-taking,

including:

(1) institutional and industry variables, (2) firm aspirations that are based on past
performance and industry average, (3) specific resources and a particular type of resource
- knowledge, and (4) corporate governance. The strength of these factors could vary
across situations, but in order to have a clear picture of how to stimulate effective risk
management systems in corporations it is crucial to look at all four sets o f factors
simultaneously.

This simultaneous view allows us to see the interactions, and the

analysis o f factors related to agency theory permits us to rank board o f directors
parameters by their strength of influence.

This dissertation’s results are of interest not only to academia, but to the world of
practitioners, because they give managers information on how the external environment
and internal factors, including governance mechanisms, influence risk-taking of
companies, and what role knowledge base plays. Government and regulatory bodies can
benefit from this research because their role as rule setters is covered under the
institutional and industry levels o f analysis.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL

2.1 Risk, Measures of Risk and Strategy

Risk has been the focus of much theoretical and practical research for decades.
Both executives and academics have tried to develop practical concepts and techniques
for assessing risk. Singhvi (1980) notes that “risk, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the
beholder,” which means that under similar internal and external circumstances, various
people and companies draw different risk pictures.

One of the first to make the distinction between risk and uncertainty in economic
terms was Knight (1921), who argues that “certainty” takes place when decision
outcomes can have finite probabilities, like one or zero. “Risk,” therefore, is defined as
the probability distribution o f all the existing outcomes that can be projected when
probabilities shift from zero to one. When probability distribution cannot be estimated
“risk” turns into “uncertainty” (Knight, 1921). While very logical, Knight’s definition
and argument have not been widely accepted by researchers in economics and other
fields, such as psychology, that study organizations (Bromiley & Johnson, 2005). The
muddle around risk and uncertainty was well noted by Bettis (1982) who said:
“Technically, there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty... Almost all authors
after noting this distinction ignore it and use risk and uncertainty interchangeably.” Not
only do different fields that

study organizations have different views on risk, but

practitioners also understand risk in a fashion contrary to Knight (Baird & Thomas, 1990;
March & Shapira, 1987). For instance, for managers risk seems to be more of a downside
concept - specified in terms of failure to perform at a given level. Downside is more
relevant to practicing managers than performance variability, which includes both upside
and downside outcomes (Miller & Reuer, 1996). Singhvi (1980) defined risk as “the
estimated degree o f uncertainty with respect to realization of the expected return or
outcome.” This description o f risk includes approximations of uncertainty as typically
defined (Nohria & Stewart, 2006).

2.1.1 Risk and Performance Relationship

Risk is a multi-dimensional concept, and it leads to various perspectives on what
risk-taking is. For example, in the literature risk may include financial leverage1 of the
company

(Combs & Ketchen Jr, 1999; Gale, 1972; Hall & Weiss, 1967), level of

corporate diversification (Jensen, 1989; Lang & Stulz, 1993; Ramanujam & Varadarajan,
1989), variability o f the income stream (Haurin, 1991; Miller & Bromiley, 1990), and
perceptions of top executives (Miller & Friesen, 1986; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Weber,
Blais, & Betz, 2002).

In the strategic management discipline, seminal study is the work o f Bowman
(1980) who found a negative relationship between risk and return. This relationship was
particularly strong for companies with below-average performance. Labeled as
1 Also called Debt-to-Equity ratio and denoted D/E

"risk/return paradox," this finding was contrary to the positive risk-return relation that
was established in the field of finance for decades. As a proxy for risk, Bowman
employed the variance o f the retum-on-equity (ROE) from annual reports. Bowman's
(1980) explanations for the risk/return paradox include: (1) variations in managerial
talent enabled companies with high-quality management teams to consistently have both
higher performance and lower risk, as compared to companies with management teams of
lower quality; (2) the pattern o f investment decisions o f some companies reflected more
risk-seeking than risk-avoiding decisions; (3) companies with lower profitability assumed
risks that companies with higher profitability avoided altogether; (4) market dominance
of a company seems to permit both higher profits and lower risk levels.

Most studies in the field o f finance found a positive relationship between risk
levels and performance (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987; Cardozo & Smith, 1983; Jegers, 1991).
Using PIMS database, Aaker and Jacobson (1987) established a positive association
between performance and both systematic and unsystematic risks. Risks in that study
were defined using accounting data.

Some studies found no relationship between risk and performance (Bettis &
Mahajan, 1985). For instance, variance in returns, average returns and risk had
associations that changed over time (Figenbaum & Thomas, 1986). Relationship between
systematic risk of the company's stock returns and the stock market, which is generally
known as beta,

and returns measured via accounting tools had no association

(Figenbaum & Thomas, 1986).

2 After-tax profit divided by stockholder's equity
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Literature suggests that risk is a multidimensional concept and should be regarded
as such (Haimes, 2009; Resek, 1970). The multidimensional nature o f risk implies that
there are a number o f factors that affect corporate levels of risk. For example, on the firm
level, if one applies the view that a firm is a coalition (Cyert & March, 1963), also called
relevant stakeholders view (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), it becomes clear that various risk
dimensions reflect the multitudes of interests of coalition members. Differences in risk
dimensions have bearings on performance; for instance, income stream uncertainty
negatively influences corporate performance (Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Bromiley, 1990;
Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996), while downside risk positively influences subsequent
corporate performance (Miller & Leiblein, 1996a). Many constructs from the behavioral
theory o f the firm affect corporate risk levels. For example, risk-taking is increased if
corporate performance is below the aspirations levels, and there is a strong positive
relationship between these constructs, i.e. the larger the gap between corporate
performance and aspirations, the higher the

risk-taking will be.

Interestingly,

organizational slack generally reduces risk-taking tendencies (Moses, 1992; Singh, 1986;
Su, Xie, & Li, 2009). In accordance with predictions of agency theory, strong corporate
governance systems appear to mitigate risk-aversion of managers, whereas, the general
effect o f stock ownership is increased risk-taking of managers (Palmer & Wiseman,
1999; Rochet, 1999).
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2.1.2 Risk Management

A Global Survey of Economist Intelligence Unit

questioned 334 financial

services executives, and 60% of respondents said that the importance o f risk management
was not understood throughout their organization (Stringer, 2009). Two thirds are no
longer confident that policy makers can produce an adequate and effective response to
the economic meltdown. Respondents pronounced that risk management reform within
institutions would have to be far-reaching and radical. The survey results show the
magnitude of the current problem, and it is especially interesting in light o f the research
findings that risk management is regarded as one o f the most important goals of financial
executives (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993). From this perspective the global financial
crisis can be viewed as a malfunction within an institutional environment, because risk
was ignored industry-wide (Johnson & Kwak, 2010). Many key players o f the market
that constitute the fabric o f the institutional environment, such as regulators —including
Securities and Exchange Commission, government bodies - including Federal Reserve
and Treasury, credit rating agencies - including Standard and Poor’s, M oody’s and Fitch,
were either unaware o f risks or were passive in their roles in preventing unrealistic risk
exposures (Lucchetti, Scannell, & Shah, 2008).

Going back to the example o f global financial crisis, and looking at it on a
company level, it becomes apparent that risk management practices within companies
emphasized short-term rates of return over long-term risk-adjusted return (McDonald,
3 From <http://mikhailfedorov.wordpress.com/2009/f0/03/after-the-storm-a-new-era-for-riskmanagement-in-financial-services/> [Accessed 02.19.2011 at 19:34]

2009). For instance, many financial institutions that made a decision to take part in
securitization o f mortgages, trading in derivatives and collaterized debt obligations4
ended up going bankrupt or accessed TARM funds (Lo, 2009). Also company level
analysis demonstrates that during this financial crisis different financial institutions were
affected differently (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). This difference in effect is due to
variations in risk management techniques that are at the project and company levels
(Bartlett, 2004; Chapman & Ward, 2002). Risk management on a company level consists
o f three main phases: (1) risk identification, (2) risk assessment and (3) management of
risk (Leitch, 2009; Singhal & Singhal, 2009). Risk identification includes source analysis
and problem analysis (Pritchard, 2010). Risk assessment consists o f impact analysis and
probability o f the risk analysis (Pritchard, 2010). Management of risk includes four main
strategies: (1) risk avoidance, also called elimination, (2) risk reduction or mitigation, (3)
risk transfer, which includes outsourcing or using insurance, and (4) risk acceptance,
which leads to retention and budgeting. If the company chooses retention, it should set up
a contingency for it. (Ranasinghe, 1994; Touran, 2003; Yeo, 1990). How much that
contingency should be linked to a company’s resource base still remains under debate
(Cioffi & Khamooshi, 2008a). Some scholars argue that contingency budgeting is
perceived as a waste of resources (Pate-Comeli & Dillon, 2001); others suggest that a
company should assign a fixed percentage of total costs as contingency (Yeo, 1990).
Application o f fixed percentages has been criticized for being inexact in giving the
amounts needed should risk materialize (Touran, 2003).

Yeo (1990) showed that an

arbitrary 10%, 20%, or 30% is usually set aside and suggested using the contingency-

4 Sometimes called CDOs
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estimating system concept. This concept combines aspects of the conventional “classes of
estimate” approach with a statistical method, uses range estimates and applies the theory
of probability for risk assessment and contingency estimation. A newer scientific method
suggests finding optimal contingency allocation using models which take into account
total number of risks and severity and probability of each risk (Cioffi & Khamooshi,
2008b; Khamooshi & Cioffi, 2009). This method has an advantage o f allowing financial
managers to allocate the optimal level of contingency when accepting risks. This
evidence suggests that in order to understand the nature and effects of risk, one should
look not only at institutional variables, but at company level variables as well.

2.1.3 Measures o f Risk

When it comes to the measurement of risk, a variety o f risk proxies are used. The
most common risk proxies are variability o f accounting returns over time, such as retumon-assets (ROA) and retum-on-equity (Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2001). The majority of
measures are the results o f (1) availability o f data, (2) simplicity of computation, and (3)
instances o f past usage in other disciplines (Bromiley et al., 2001).

As a measure of risk, most studies that followed the research direction o f using
the variance of the retum-on-equity (Bowman, 1982; 1980; Fiegenbaum & Thomas,
1985) employed standard deviation of the retum-on-equity (Baucus, Golec, & Cooper,
1993; Gooding, Goel, & Wiseman, 1996; Jegers, 1991), variance o f the retum-on-equity
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(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Jegers, 1991), variance o f the retum-on-equity around the
time trend (Oviatt & Bauerschmidt, 1991), adjusted variance of the retum-on-equity
(Marsh & Swanson, 1984), standard deviation o f the retum-on-assets (Baucus et al.,
1993; Cool, Dierickx, & Jemison, 1989; Jemison, 1987), variance of the retum-on-assets
(Fiegenbaum, 1990; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999), standard
deviation of the retum-on-sales (Cool et al., 1989), and the standard deviation o f the
annual percentage change in earnings (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). To overcome
concerns about the measurement quality of standard deviation and variance, several
researchers introduced distinctive measures based on accounting returns, including an
adjusted risk measure for autocorrelation within firms over time (Marsh & Swanson,
1984), the sum o f absolute deviations around each firm's average retum-on-equity over
four years (Woo, 1987), the estimation of accounting betas by fitting accountings-return
data to the capital asset pricing model (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987), returns variability
around a time trend (Oviatt & Bauerschmidt, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991), the
standard deviation of annual percentage changes in earnings (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993),
and the mean-quadratic-differences over a five-year time slot and the variance o f retumon-equity around the median (Lehner, 2000).

When the stock market data is available, the most common tools that researchers
use to account for risk are the estimates of systematic and unsystematic risk from the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Treynor, 1961, 1962). Systematic
and unsystematic risks capture risk from the perspective of stock-owners. Other common
measures of risk derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model are: accounting beta using
retum-on-equity (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987) and Jensen's beta for estimation of
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unsystematic risk (Amit & Wemerfelt, 1990). Scholars in strategic management
questioned the meaningfulness of the Capital Asset Pricing Model's risk measures and
implications o f those measures (Bromiley et al., 2001). For instance, contrary to the
predictions o f the Capital Asset Pricing Model, general managers do try to minimize
unsystematic risk (Bettis, 1983). The relevance o f Beta for the strategic management field
was challenged and criticized on the grounds o f small empirical support for CAPM
(Chatterjee, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 1999; Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999).

Additional interesting measures of risk include: annual report content analysis
(Bowman, 1984), standard deviation o f EPS forecast (Bromiley, 1991; Deephouse &
Wiseman, 2000; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996), Beta Altman's
Z (D'Aveni & Ilinitch, 1992), and entropy measure derived from shifting rank within an
industry (Collins & Ruefli, 1992).

To account for the multidimensional nature of risk several researchers used more
than two risk measures at once. For example, Woo (1987) used the sum of absolute
deviation around average retum-on-equity, variability in market share around time trend,
and price-cost gap. Cool and Schendel (1987) measured risk with standard deviation of
market share, weighted segment share and retum-on-sales, absolute value o f percentage
change from average past retum-on-equity, retum-on-assets, current ratio, and sales to
total assets. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) employed absolute value o f percentage
change from average past retum-on-equity, retum-on-assets, current ratio, and sales to
total assets, standard deviation of retum-on-assets, standard deviation of retum-on-equity,
standard deviation o f analysts' eamings-per-share forecasts, and coefficient o f variation
o f analysts' eamings-per-share forecasts.

Miller and Bromiley (1990) simultaneously

used beta, unsystematic risk, debt-to-equity ratio, capital intensity and R&D intensity.
Wiseman and Bromiley (1991) utilized variance in retum-on-equity and variance in
retum-on-assets, variance in retum-on-equity and variance in retum-on-assets around a
time trend, RLPM using stock returns, RLPM using retum-on-assets and retum-onequity, downside beta, probability of falling below industry average earnings to price
ratio and retum-on-assets. Miller and Reuer (1996) applied standard deviation o f retumon-assets, retum-on-equity Beta, unsystematic risk, coefficient of variation o f forecasted
eamings-per-share, and Altman's Z. Miller and Leiblein (1996a) employed RLPM based
on retum-on-assets, standard deviation of retum-on-assets, standard deviation around
retum-on-assets trend, and absolute value o f year-to-year change in retum-on-equity.
Lehner (2000) employed mean o f quadratic difference in retum-on-equity and variance of
retum-on-equity around the median. Reuer and Leiblein (2000) used RLPM using retumon-assets, retum-on-equity and downside beta.

16

2.2 Deregulation

Starting in the late 1970s many nations including the United States substantially
liberalized key parameters o f their banking regulations (Feldmann, 2012). More
deregulations followed in the 2000s, leading the banking sector to a situation where it is
largely stripped o f most restrictions, some of which had been in place for many decades
(Feldmann, 2012). A few examples of deregulations include elimination of controls of
interest rates, removal of barriers to entry for foreign banks, decrease in state ownership
and loans issued for political reasons with lower than market rates to specific sectors of
the economy (Feldmann, 2012; Fuentelsaz, Gomez, & Polo, 2002).

The question o f the effects of deregulation is important because o f its long term
and far reaching effects and, even more so, because of the global financial crisis o f 20072009. As a result o f this crisis, which increased unemployment around the world and in
the United States, banking regulation has been reviewed and substantially tightened
(Ashcraft & Adrian, 2012). Most literature on deregulation is in support of deregulatory
initiatives. Let us review some of the main reasons for supporting deregulations.

2.2.1 Deregulation and Economic Growth

Deregulation is linked directly to economic growth. The removal o f bank branch
restrictions in the United States was a good setting to examine the relationship (Jayaratne
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& Strahan, 1996).

Evidence suggested that rates of per capita income growth and

aggregate output amplified significantly right after intrastate branch deregulation
(Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996). Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) argue that the improvement in
economic growth can only be attributed to deregulation o f the banking system and
nothing else. Economic growth follows enhancements in the quality of bank lending, but
not enhancement o f the volume of lending, and this effect brings fast economic growth
(Jayaratne & Strahan, 1996).

There are many more studies providing evidence that more pro-competitive
banking regulation leads to a more efficient banking sector (Fu & Heffeman, 2007;
Hasan & Marton, 2003; Huang, 2000). Privatization is the first of the regulations that are
considered to be pro-competitive and to increase the efficiency of banks (Beck, Cull, &
Jerome, 2005; Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Bhaumik & Dimova, 2004; Bonaccorsi di
Patti & Hardy, 2005; Hasan & Marton, 2003), while regulations allowing easier entry for
foreign banks follow closely in second place (Figueira, Nellis, & Parker, 2009; Li, 2008).

Empirical analysis of financial deregulation in Bangladesh from 1975 to 1995
provides evidence for the theory o f endogenous growth (Siddiki, 2002). Siddiki (2002)
argues that financial deregulation, accompanied by investments in human capital,
improves the growth rate of the economy, thus building the case for deregulation of
financial sectors. The study utilized variations o f time series techniques, and results were
very stable across a multitude o f methodologies (Siddiki, 2002).

Mixed results of deregulation on economic growth were shown in the example of
the airline industry in the United States (Winston, 1998). Deregulation o f airlines started
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in 1974, and was completed in nine years, with elimination o f control on fares, control on
entries and control on exits o f airlines. Winston (1998) argues that even 20 years after
deregulation, airlines show massive inefficiencies and employ practices that would have
been illegal under strict regulations of fares. Thus, deregulated or partially deregulated
industries may not achieve immediate efficiencies and instead may continue operating in
Pareto sub-optimal ways (Winston, 1998).

Policymakers are pressured to deliver economic growth, which means that if
deregulation does not produce immediate results, policymakers tend to reverse
deregulation, and reregulate or block any future deregulation (Stiroh & Strahan, 2003).
For instance, cable television was deregulated by Congress in 1984 and then reregulated
in 1992: this shift from deregulation to reregulation resulted in a decrease in consumer
welfare (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996). Just a year after the Telecommunications
Act o f 1996, many policymakers were expressing concerns about cable rates not having
decreased in 1997, thus arguing that economic welfare was not created by deregulation,
and ignoring the time element and the fact that the telecommunications industry was still
regulated (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996; Hausman & Taylor, 2012).

Deregulation may lead to economic growth via improvements in corporate
governance, which leads to more innovativeness in companies (Winston, Corsi, Grimm,
& Evans, 1990). Railroad deregulation led to employment of managers that were
younger, better educated and had fewer years of company service, suggesting they were
more creative, which eventually improved economic welfare (Winston et al., 1990). In a
similar fashion, there is evidence that deregulation in airlines led to employment of
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managers that were more entrepreneurial and more creative, and this eventually led to
improvement in economic growth (Kole & Lehn, 1997; Meyer & Oster Jr, 1984).

After reviewing deregulation effects in six industries including airline, less-thantruckload trucking, truckload trucking, railroads, banking and natural gas, the main
reasons for economic growth were increase in productivity and reduction o f costs
(Winston, 1998). Real operating costs in the six industries studied were on average
reduced from 25 to 75 percent, and this cost reduction led to economic welfare creation
(Winston, 1998).

The impact o f deregulation on banks is examined, and deregulation allowing
interstate acquisitions and statewide branching is linked to a decrease o f both costs and
prices of the services provided by banks (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1998), thus leading to a
more efficient banking system and economic growth.

2.2.2 Deregulation and Capital Flows

This section will review studies that link deregulation with capital flows, because
enhancement of capital flows often used as a reason for deregulation (Reddy, 2012). The
majority o f studies examining deregulation and capital flows obtain moderately favorable
results, and this fact distinguishes them from the papers on deregulation and economic
growth from the previous section and from the papers on labor market and deregulation
that will be reviewed in the next section. Employing the panel causality method to test if
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deregulation can influence the level o f capital-flight, which indicates the level of
accumulation o f foreign assets by private companies, no significant relationship of
causality was shown (Yalta & Yalta, 2011). Data was gathered from 21 nations with
emerging markets for the period o f 1980 to 2004, and no evidence of causal relationship
was established (Yalta & Yalta, 2011). Interesting was the fact that values o f capitalflight that were logged in the model appeared to increase its present level, suggesting
characteristics that can be described as self-reinforcing (Yalta & Yalta, 2011). The
conclusion that Yalta and Yalta arrived at was that financial deregulations may not
prevent in any way the appearance of capital-flight (Yalta & Yalta, 2011).

The second study tries to answer if volatility of capital flows changes after
financial deregulation, and it utilizes the panel data set based on 22 developing and
industrial nations from 1981 to 2010 (Neumann, Penl, & Tanku, 2009). The data set had
overlapping values, and researchers examined how financial deregulation is affected by
the reactions o f foreign direct investment, flows o f debt and portfolio. The variables that
measured financial deregulation were borrowed from Kaminsky and Schmukler’s index
(Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2003). One o f the findings was that financial deregulation
influences various capital flows differently, and while foreign direct investment
demonstrated a large gain in volatility, portfolio flows were unaffected (Kaminsky &
Schmukler, 2003). Results that deregulation had mixed effects were particularly strong
for emerging nations.
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2.2.3 Deregulation and Employment

Improvement o f employment is often used as a reason for deregulation (Ebell &
Haefke, 2009). One should note that the number o f empirical studies analyzing the effects
o f deregulation and employment is relatively low, and most o f them have data sets based
on the United States’ deregulations. At the beginning o f the 1980s deregulation in the
state of Delaware was linked to the reduction of unemployment rates in that state by 0.5%
(Butkiewicz & Latham, 1991). Analysis of the data set o f deregulated banking branching
across the United States from 1970 to 1988 suggested that employment was higher in the
states that deregulated and allowed interstate banking (Krol & Svomy, 1996).

In a research study with a model o f a small open economy that had two-period
inter-temporal set up, deregulation and financial

freedom

increased

aggregate

employment after all the adjustment processes (Battle, 1997).

It is theoretically established that deregulation is linked to the variation o f banks’
ability to generate loans, and the ability to generate loans is linked to variations of
employment rates (Acemoglu, 2001). According to the model of Acemoglu (2001), in
the economies with flexible credit markets, arrival of new technologies leads to quick
channeling of funds to new companies that utilize new technologies, therefore avoiding
the adverse effect of job loss by companies that suffer the negative effects o f the
technological shock. Dissimilarly, in economies with highly controlled and inflexible
credit markets, it is harder for entrepreneurs to have access to funds that are required to
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start up new companies. This leads to continuous decrease in employment (Acemoglu,
2001).

Similar to Acemoglu, Wasmer and Weil (2004) argue that credit frictions raise the
equilibrium level o f employment. Wasmer and Weil propose an equilibrium model that
incorporates imperfections of both the labor and credit markets. Researchers demonstrate
that low levels o f employment may be the outcome of credit and labor frictions at
moderate levels. Wasmer and Weil’s model shows that financial deregulation decreases
transaction costs in the form of search costs for banks; as a result more financiers are
attracted to credit markets, which then reduce unemployment by attracting a higher
number o f entrepreneurs. Thus, Wasmer and Weil proposed that the ability to provide
loans can be diminished when credit frictions from an over-regulated banking sector
exist, and this condition was linked to a raise of equilibrium unemployment (Wasmer &
Weil, 2004).

Since 1978, deregulation of American banking has been linked to an increase of
the growth rate o f self-employed income and optimized access for financial resources for
previously underserved small businesses (Demyanyk, 2008; Demyanyk, Ostergaard, &
Sorensen, 2007). Deminyak (2008) also points to the existence of a possible transmission
link via which more pro-competitive regulation for banks acts as an improving
mechanism for the labor market. The transmission link may include improved quality of
financial intermediaries (Demyanyk, 2008; Zhang, Wang, & Wang, 2012), larger entry of
new firms (Denizer, 1997; Laeven, 2003) and quicker capital accumulation (Levchenko,
Ranciere, & Thoenig, 2009).

Utilizing the data from both pre- and post- deregulation periods, researchers
examined the changes in the cost structure o f banks, employing a translog cost function
to see if economies o f scale and scope exist (Rezvanian, Rangan, & Grabowski, 2011).
The results provide evidence that on average the cost curve remained U-shaped, but
became flatter as time passed, suggesting an increase o f the optimal bank size.
Economies of scope that took place before the introduction of deregulation became
exhausted once deregulation was in place (Rezvanian et al., 2011). Another study of
interstate deregulation of the banking industry in the United States in the 1980s provided
evidence that regulation dampened volatility for firm-level employment (Correa &
Suarez, 2007).

The time effect of deregulation was examined in a study assessing outcomes after
15 years of intrastate branching deregulation in the United States. The evidence
suggested that deregulation increased the rate o f employment by two percentage points
(Beck, Levine, & Levkov, 2010). A more recent study again showed that more restrictive
banking regulations lead to increased unemployment (Feldmann, 2012).

Even though most research papers provide support for the positive effect of
financial deregulation on employment, there is one paper that finds contrary evidence.
Deregulation in the U.K. increased unemployment from 1979 to 2005 (Baddeley, 2008).
An empirical study by Baddeley (2008) is the exception to all the other studies.

The effect o f deregulation on the labor market around the world shows that
deregulation has a different effect in different nations (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004). In the study o f 85 countries where the effect of financial
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deregulation is modeled via employment, collective relations and laws governing the
social security system, heavier regulation was associated with higher unemployment and
lower labor participation (Botero et al., 2004). The results are strongest for younger
people. Countries with socialist, French and Scandinavian legal origins had drastically
higher levels o f regulation and higher unemployment, as compared to nations with
common law (Botero et al., 2004).
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2.3 Level I: Institutional Perspective and Industry Variables

One o f the largest institutional failures of current times took place when a number
of United States banks overleveraged their capital structures and took positions in toxic
assets. This strategy brought those banks to the verge o f bankruptcy and put the United
States’ government in a position where it was forced to bail them out using Troubled
Asset Relief Program funds, also known as TARP money (Ausubel & Cramton, 2008;
Bebchuk, 2009). TARP money for

“troubled assets” is defined as money for "(A)

residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments
that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued
on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase o f which the Secretary determines promotes
financial market stability; and (B) any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after
consultation with the Chairman of the Board o f Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, determines that the purchase of the instrument is necessary to promote financial
market stability, but only upon transmittal of such determination, in writing, to the
appropriate committees of Congress."5 A number of new regulations have been passed
following this financial crisis, including limits on the leverage levels by financial
institutions, thus changing the institutional environment and so reducing the overall risk
within the economy (Lemer, 2011).

Started by Selznik (1957), old institutionalism emphasized that companies will
change and adapt, acting as adaptive systems which change in reaction to the traits of
5 From < http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doclQ056/06-29-TARP.Ddf> [Accessed at 10:12am
on 03.06.2011]

people within them and inputs from the external environment. Selznick witnessed how
institutionalization takes place among Tennessee Valley Authority officials who gained
legitimacy and support by cooptation, and how institutionalization was a mechanism
transforming external elements into a decision-making system of the company (Selznick,
1957). Selznick argued that formal structures in organizations serve two purposes: the
function o f defining roles and symbolic properties. Selznick emphasized that social
legitimacy is accentuated by structures that reflect the values of organizations and also
provide a connection between core company values and values of a society as a whole
(Selznick, 1957). According to Selznik, adaptation was mainly for efficiency reasons, and
this view was supported in the work of Chandler (1962), who did historical analysis of
four companies, including the energy-production company Standard Oil o f New Jersey,
the chemical company Du Pont, the automobile producer General Motors, and the retail
company Sears Roebuck, and documented the wide spread o f multi-divisional or M-form
(Rumelt & Teece, 1994).

Over time the idea changed and scholars suggested that environment is socially
constructed (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). If society rewards companies that are efficient,
operate in rational ways, and demonstrate ability to take risks, it will value companies
whose structures reflect those values best, regardless o f whether actual behavior in the
companies is consistent (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This put forward the idea that social
perceptions are important for companies’ successes. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that
external social perceptions were at times more powerful than internal processes of
production. The value o f social legitimacy of observed organizational structures, even
when structures were dysfunctional, often surpassed observed outcomes o f performance
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(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As a consequence of this finding, various resources would flow
to companies that demonstrate the highest levels of isomorphic consistency with the
environment that they are operating in. Interestingly, the flow of resources would occur
despite possible inefficiencies of those companies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This is
especially important for not-for-profit companies and public sector organizations, many
of which, in order to be successful, develop the ability to act in accordance with the
“legitimacy rule.” And it all takes place because companies are legitimated externally on
bases other than production efficiencies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Isomorphism is defined
along two dimensions: (1) boundary-spanning connections between companies and the
environment are the outcome of technology exchanges and forced diffusion of
institutional practices, myths and norms (Thompson, 1967), and (2) socially constructed
realities are mirrored by organizational structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that companies converge over time in the
legitimacy dimension, becoming more similar rather than more heterogeneous.
Organizational change takes place due to the vectors forcing companies to assimilate, but
not necessarily become more efficient, they argued (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that in the environments with high levels of
uncertainty, managers observe the behavior of other managers, particularly those from
highly legitimate companies, in order to implement organizational change.

DiMaggio and Powell argued that convergence happens through isomorphism that
can have three forms: (1) coercive isomorphism - a result of formal and informal
pressures exerted on the company by other organizations on which it is dependent, (2)
mimetic isomorphism - a result of companies voluntarily modeling themselves after
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organizations that are perceived to have higher status, i.e. more legitimacy, and (3)
normative isomorphism - a result of professionalization and formal education, which via
socialization leads to conformity on informal rules, customs and various patterns of
communication and interaction (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).

The theoretical foundations of institutional isomorphism are based on the notion
that companies compete for more than clientele or resources; they compete for political
influence and institutional legitimacy (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002; Park & Luo, 2001).
The organizational field is a set of companies that constitute an area o f institutional life
that can be recognized, making it similar to the notion o f organizational population
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1978). DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
suggested that as time goes by, various inventions are diffused in the society, and slowly
continuing adoption is done not for productivity enhancements but for legitimacy
reasons. Over time the aggregate result of organizational change is to lessen the diversity
o f organizations.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that the rationale for

organizational change includes the following: traits of companies are changed to enhance
compatibility with the traits o f the environment, the number o f companies in the
population is a function o f the carrying capacity o f the population, and the variety of
organizational types is isomorphic to the variety o f environmental surroundings. When
two companies depend on each other, that dependence promotes isomorphism, in order to
enhance the exchange relationship between the two (Nelson & Gopalan, 2003).
Environmental uncertainty forces isomorphism when less successful companies try to
copy more successful organizational forms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Sets of
companies where a high degree o f reliance on professionalism prevails will have higher
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levels o f isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Environments with highly
concentrated resources stimulate isomorphism. Power is measured by the company’s
ability to ‘determine’ or ‘change’ social myths and results from a high degree of
legitimacy o f a particular company.

Summarizing the main research work pieces on institutional theory, one can say
that organizations are legitimated externally by society rather than in terms o f their
performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Over time organizational changes occur because
of processes that make organizations more similar, but not necessarily more efficient
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Also, institutions consist o f cognitive, normative, and
regulative “pillars” that provide meaning to social behavior (Scott, 2001).

2.3.1 Players in the Institutional Environment: Credit Rating Agencies

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are important players and contributors to the
institutional dimension of the environment of financial systems, and were extensively
criticized before and especially after the current crisis. Due to their business objectives,
credit rating agencies have conflicting goals, such as preserving large customers and
signaling to the market the credit worthiness of banks (Carl, 2009; Matthew & Lawrence,
2009; Powell, Rigobon, & Cavallo, 2009). Conflict of interests can result in credit rating
agencies being in a position where they are reluctant to rate larger banks as riskier
investments due to the banks’ economic influence, and they are only too eager to rate
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them favorably (Griffin & Tang, 2011; Lipszyc, 2011). In addition, banks can choose
CRAs, and so they can shop around for the most favorable credit rating (Cantor &
Packer, 1995; Lipszyc, 2011). CRAs suggested that their ratings are stable because they
measure the default risk over the long investment horizon and only incorporate
information that is likely to be enduring (Cantor, 2001; Cantor & Mann, 2003).
Ironically, because of the scale of potential impact on the economy, ratings o f larger
banks should be examples of accuracy and precision (Griffin & Tang, 2011). It may be
because o f conflicts o f interest o f CRAs that the United States and world economy is
going through one of the worst financial calamities since the Great Depression.

There are 64 credit rating agencies worldwide6; in the United States the largest
ones are: Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. The SEC currently designates 6
agencies as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” (NRSROs). They have
letter designations for credit ratings such as AAA, BB, or CC. Credit rating agencies have
been criticized for large losses in the Collaterized Debt Obligations (CDO) (Fong, Hong,
Kacperczyk, & Kubik, 2011). Examples of such losses can be $340.7 million worth of
CDOs issued by Credit Suisse Group that added up to about $125 million. This security
was rated AAA by Fitch. Another major criticism is that CRAs do not downgrade firms
promptly enough; for instance, Enron's rating remained at investment grade four days
before the company went bankrupt (De Lange & Arnold, 2012; Lundblad & Davidson,
2011). Current reliance on CRAs increased due to: (1) financial market complexity and
(2) borrowers’ diversity (Cantor & Packer, 1995).

6 From < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit rating aeencv> [Accessed 02.22.2011 at 23:58]

31

CRAs addressed criticisms of being slow in adjusting their ratings, stating that
they use the through-the-cycle methodology (Griffin & Tang, 2011). According to
Moody’s, through-the-cycle ratings are stable because they are intended to measure
default risk over long investment horizons, and because they are changed only when
agencies are confident that observed changes in a company’s risk profile are likely to be
permanent. Credit rating agencies were compared to banks because both consider similar
risk factors (Griffin & Tang, 2011; Treacy & Carey, 2000), and both rely heavily on
judgment and cultural elements (Carl, 2009), rather than on detailed and mechanical
guidance

and procedures

(Treacy

&

Carey,

2000).

However,

CRAs

publish

supplementary rating descriptions of rating criteria that are much more detailed than
banks’ internal guidelines.

Some good news is that some researchers observed secular tightening o f rating
agency standards (Blume, Lim, & Mackinlay, 1998). Yet this paper contradicts findings
that leverage ratios deteriorated and default rates rose within rating categories (Cantor &
Packer, 1995). Unrealistic panel regression estimates o f rating determinants implicitly
assume that ratings adjust instantaneously to new information (Altman & Rijken, 2004).
Rating migration policies o f the agencies do not follow “point-in-time” rating practices
(Altman & Rijken, 2004). Agency ratings are stable because they are intended to measure
the default risk over the long investment horizon and only when observed changes in a
company’s risk profile are likely enduring (Cantor, 2001; Fons, 2002; Cantor & Mann,
2003).
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2.3.2 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

After the passing o f The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial
Services Modernization Act o f 1999, or the Citigroup Relief Act that overturned
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, deregulation of investment banking took place (Mamun,
Hassan, & Van Lai, 2004). This regulatory change destroyed safety mechanisms, or as
George Soros referred to it: “the principles of oil tanker design ... if they're
compartmentalized, the risk o f crisis is much lower”; thus, deregulation eliminated
compartmentalization of the financial system that was ensuring against large scale
financial calamities (George Soros, 2011). Among other things, this deregulation allowed
banks to borrow extensively and have leverage ratios as high as 1 to 30, and created an
environment with less regulatory framework (Mamun, Hassan, & Maroney, 2005; Neale
& Peterson, 2005).

Environments with fewer regulations would lead to organizational forms that
operate with more freedom and thus are accustomed to a higher degree o f autonomy and
risk-taking (Van Den Bosch, Volberda, & De Boer, 1999). Not only a small number of
regulations, or absence of particular laws, would promote risk-taking tendencies among
sets of companies, but also environments where few regulatory agencies exist would have
a similar effect (Gilardi, 2002). Regulatory agencies act as watchdogs, and when their
relative number is low, the ability o f regulatory agencies to effectively conduct
surveillance and enforce regulations decreases, effectively creating an environment with
fewer regulations (Gilardi, 2002).

A high number of risk-taking companies in the

environment with few regulations would lead to the institutionalization of risk-taking
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behavior across the board. Less successful firms would want to imitate more successful
“highly-risk-loving” companies, and eventually larger degrees of risk-taking would be
manifested as a norm (DiMaggio, 2011; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). One o f the ways in
which environmental change can be measured is the introduction o f a new law that can
substantially limit freedom in risk taking strategies that companies have. Other examples
o f this can be regulations that relate to reserve levels of banks, in essence affecting the
level o f debt that banks can have in their capital structure (Keister, 2010). The level of
debt of financial institutions is called leverage, and is one of the indications of risk
(Adrian & Shin, 2010), so change in such regulation changes risk levels across the board.
To measure the change o f the regulatory environment we need to look for the event that
reshaped it, and a good example is the introduction of a new law such as the SarbanesOxley Act7 o f 2002 (Sarbanes, 2002; Zhang, 2007) or introduction o f deregulation such
as The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Mamun et al., 2005; Neale & Peterson, 2005).
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was a good example of the deregulation that led to more
freedom in decision-making, and it leads us to the first Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. Deregulation o f an industry will be associated with higher
corporate risk-taking in that industry.

7 Known in the Senate as the 'Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act1
and in the House as 'Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act.' This act is
a federal law o f the United States that set revised standards for all American publicly traded
companies, their boards o f directors, executive teams and public accounting corporations.
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Change in regulation will have two effects. One is a direct effect of regulatory
change, and the other is the effect of changes in norms, customs and beliefs. And while
the first effect would be immediate, change in norms would take longer and would
become more pronounced with the passage of time (Scott, 1995,2001, 2003).

Institutional theory emphasizes mimetic isomorphism as a response mechanism to
reduce uncertainty, which according to DiMaggio and Powel (1983, p. 151) is a low-cost
variety o f problemistic search. Later empirical research has established this correlation by
demonstrating that mimetic behavior is stronger when uncertainty is higher (Haunschild,
1994). Extensions to institutional theory are being made by scholars studying the
interaction effects between mimetic processes and problemistic search (Chuang & Baum,
2003; Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001). The new institutional theory argues that legitimacy
provides competitive edge (Scott, 1995, 2001, 2003) and rests on three pillars that do not
need to be present simultaneously: (1) cognitive - alignment with cognitive maps
manifested in values, language, customs, religious view, etc.; (2) normative - alignment
with particular professional norms, such as the integrity component o f the accounting
profession (Grey, 2002, 2004); (3) regulative - alignment with requirements that define
the legal landscape o f business environments, such as antitrust laws. Deregulation in legal
framework would lead to changes in norms, beliefs and performance expectations over
time, thus:

Hypothesis 2. After deregulation, over time, corporate risk-taking will increase.

Deregulation may also increase competition as there are more companies with
similar profiles, i.e. o f the same size, similar financial profile, similar talent pool, and
with market commonalities and resource similarities (Chang & Xu, 2008). This happens
because there would always be struggle for change in status quo, thus promoting highly
competitive and more un-collaborative behavior (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996).
Institutional theory outlines how a company adapts to a symbolic environment of
cognitive maps and regulatory framework o f rules, and while doing so, it emphasizes (1)
bounded rationality, (2) uncertainty avoidance, (3) loose coupling and (4) decision
making under uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). All of
these are borrowings o f institutional theory from behavioral theory o f the firm (Argote &
Greve, 2007), which will be discussed in the next chapter
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2.4 Level II: Behavioral Theory of the Firm

This section starts with the review of bounded rationality in human behavior
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Concepts from the bounded rationality of humans allow us
to better understand their aspirations and are considered by some researchers as the
foundation to the behavioral theory of the firm (Bromiley & Papenhausen, 2003). After
bounded rationality, prospect theory was reviewed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992), because along with behavioral theory o f the firm, prospect theory is
considered a major theory on risk in strategic management

(Holmes Jr, Bromiley,

Devers, Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011). Then, behavioral theory of the firm is laid out and
hypotheses relevant to corporate aspirations are developed. While classical behavioral
theory of the firm links aspirations with performance, in this dissertation, aspirations are
linked with corporate risk-taking, and this is a major novel contribution.

2.4.1 Bounded Rationality

Bounded rationality of individuals leads to a series o f limitations when making
decisions, and this effect was noticed by psychologists and practitioners o f decision
making (Simon, 1947). Simon examines the internal decision-making processes of
corporations and outlines how values of companies affect decision-making o f people
working for them, by establishing consistency o f decisions and ensuring that decisions

are compatible with overarching company goals. March and Simon (1958) argue that
analysis of people’s behavior within companies should include various aspects o f human
behavior and must consider motivational, rational and attitudinal dimensions. This means
that the science o f organizations is based on two streams - first, the research of
economists on the planning process and, second, the research o f psychologists on
organizational communication and abilities to solve-problems (Pfeffer, 1993).

“Bounded rationality assumes that individuals easily satisfied; that is they select
the first alternative that is good enough because the costs o f optimizing in terms of time
and effort are too great” (Ackoff, 1981; p. 22). This means there is a limit on the level of
rationality that a human may demonstrate. “A theory of bounded rationality also assumed
that individuals develop shortcuts, rules of thumb, or heuristics, to make decisions in
order to save mental activity” (Nelson & Quick, 2006; p. 314). These notions have
following implications for organizational behavior: “Given the limitations and systematic
biases of the individual, those operating from a behavioral perspective tend to view the
organization as a more efficient information processor than any individual. The firm is
considered to be an institutional response to uncertainty and bounded rationality at the
individual level” (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1992; p. 107). This means that under challenging
circumstances companies will try to make satisfactory instead of optimal decisions.
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2.4.2 Prospect Theory

Prospect theory describes how individuals make decisions under risk (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). This theory explains how people evaluate potential gains and losses.
There are many anomalies and effects based on prospect theory. It is particularly
interesting to look at the pseudocertainty effect, which is the study o f individuals being
risk-averse or risk-loving depending on if the gamble relates to gaining or losing, and on
the amounts involved (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). Pseudocertainty effect
suggests that people are more sensitive to losing a given amount than to gaining the same
amount.

Behavior of executives of investment banks when they manipulate earnings can
be looked at from the prospect theory point o f view (Bartov & Mohanram, 2004). There
is evidence that people consider it ethically more acceptable when earnings are
manipulated down, rather than up, and for small amounts rather than large ones (Dechow,
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). For executives in power, prospect theory suggests that
managers would be more inclined to manipulate if there is a chance that earnings will
decrease, because this usually leads to immediate negative consequences for them
(Beneish, 1999). Several papers prove this idea. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found
evidence that companies manage earnings so as to avoid sudden decreases or losses, and
pointed to prospect theory as an explanation o f such behavior.

Matsumoto (2002) argues that managers try to avoid negative earnings by
employing positive abnormal accruals and forecasts that are lower than expected. He also

finds that firms that have higher institutional ownership, greater reliance on implicit
claims with stakeholders, and higher value-relevance of earnings were more inclined to
exceed earnings expectations. Kasznik (1996) investigates the connection between
voluntary disclosure of companies and management’s good judgment over accounting
decisions (Kasznik, 1996). Earnings management was used as a tool to correct
management’s earnings projection errors (Bergstresser, Desai, & Rauh, 2006). Empirical
results suggest that managers, who are intimidated by the possibility of costly litigations
by shareholders or credibility failure leading to the loss o f reputation, use accounting
techniques to reduce their forecast inaccuracies (Rosner, 2003).

Managers also make operating decisions to avoid reporting losses (Bergstresser et
al., 2006). Those decisions include price discounts to temporarily increase sales to meet
annual numbers, or overproduction, which in reports decreases the cost of goods sold
(Roychowdhury, 2006). However, manipulation o f real activities is less likely to take
place in the presence of sophisticated investors, who can spot activities which do not
contribute to long run profitability.

An interesting empirical work tested if publicly held financial companies would
report fewer earnings decreases over a 12 year period (Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 1999).
Researchers discovered that publicly held banks with earnings near zero were
substantially less likely to report low earnings in comparison to private banks. In that
research, control variables were bank size, differences in given loans and cash flow
streams. A peculiar finding was that after controlling for the length o f cash flows, the
length o f the stream of consecutive earnings increases was greater for public financial
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institutions (Beatty et al., 1999). Researchers concluded that public banks’ managers face
higher pressure and incentive to report higher earnings than private banks’ managers.

Research papers in this section are evidence supporting prospect theory and
explaining the reason why managers o f investment banks that are not doing well
manipulate earnings more eagerly, more often and on a larger scale (Swartz & Watkins,
2003; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2004; Zandstra, 2002).

2.4.3 Risk Taking and Organizational Aspirations

Cyert and March’s (1963) BTOF8 inspired a number of studies by Bromiley
(Bromiley, 1991; Bromiley, 1999; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991) and his students (Miller,
1998; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Miller & Leiblein, 1996b; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996;
Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). The core o f BTOF is the search for strategies reducing
uncertainty, and it provides a platform to build a theory about organizational risk. The
explicit link between risk and behavioral theory o f the firm was made by March and
Shapira (1987; 1992), as well as some modifications to the initial theory. Behavioral
theory o f the firm suggests two approaches to risk taking; the first is based on the work of
Cyert and March (1963), and the second is based on March and Shapira (1987; 1992).

March and Shapira (1987; 1992) interviewed a number o f managers and
concluded that executives navigate using two reference points: (1) a possibility of

8 Behavioral Theory o f the Firm
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bankruptcy and (2) aspiration level. If executives fear that their company is set to go
bankrupt, they will make highly risky decisions in order to avoid the disaster. Companies
with higher performance and a miniscule chance of going bankrupt will have a different
reference point and will make decisions that will reduce risk and probability of
bankruptcy. March and Shapira (1987) argued that most executives use industry average
or performance in the past as a benchmark for their reference point. So, for the majority
o f companies operating near aspiration levels, risk taking will be low, but it would
increase proportionally as performance distances from aspirations. Companies operating
below aspirations take chances as an attempt to reach aspirations.

From the behavioral perspective, a company is represented as a coalition of
various constituencies (Cyert & March, 1963), and all organized business activities are
actually emerged into unpredictability and ambiguity. Managers face the challenge of
constantly balancing competing and conflicting goals (Vibert, 2004).

Most scholars

doing research in behavioral theory of the firm believe that executives can be effective in
their balancing attempts. Fulfilling the goals of “stakeholders (shareholders, customers,
employees, unions, managers) is possible if managers make decisions to integrate and
mediate the interests o f shareholders, employees and customers” (Eisenhardt & Brown,
1992; p. 107). Still, now and then the complexity of balancing can be overwhelming,
considering that the interests of members of the ruling coalition are dynamic and
constantly changing, while the makeup o f the coalition members changes, too (Vibert,
2004).

The actual process of decision-making was emphasized by behavioral theorists
Cyert and March (1963), who provide extensive observations of the routines o f decision
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making in organizations. A process-oriented and empirically enhanced theory of
decisions in economic terms by various companies suggested by Cyert and March (1963)
stood the test o f time, and they are credited with presenting the basics o f the behavioral
theory of the firm, which up until today stays relevant in strategic management and
economics. Business decisions are characterized by unique dimensions, including: quasi
resolution of conflict, problematic search, avoidance o f risks and learning within
organizations (Cyert & March, 1963).

In behavioral theory o f the firm the relationship of companies’ aspirations and
performance levels is examined. When performance surpasses aspirations the company
continues to operate in accordance with established norms and routines (Bromiley et al.,
2001). However, when performance falls below aspirations, executives search for ways to
improve performance. This difference between aspirations and performance is sometimes
referred to as attainment discrepancy (Lant, 1992).

The organizational search for new

ways increases corporate risk (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991). Behavioral
theory of the firm argues that extremely high levels of corporate performance lead to
innovation via availability of slack. Innovative risk taking does not increase the risk of
performing below aspirations (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991).

Cyert and March (1963) argue that organizational aspirations are desired
performance levels in specific organizational outcomes and that organizations adjust their
aspirations based on past experience. Since past performance is judged as aspirations,
firms are expected to select new strategies to increase performance (Cyert & March,
1963). The aspirations level depends on comparisons to the firm’s own past performance
(Cyert and March, 1963), thus:
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Hypothesis 3. Investment banks with aspirations above performance will be
associated with higher corporate risk-taking, as compared to investment banks
with aspirations equal to or below performance.

Behavioral theory of the firm led to the rise in research in both evolutionary
economics and in organizational learning (Argote & Greve, 2007). “A key assumption of
the behavioral theory o f the firm is that firms adjust their behavior in response to their
experience rather than acting on their expectations o f future states o f the world” (Lant &
Shapira, 2008; p. 60). The aspirations level depends on comparisons to other relevant
companies, or peer group, which constitutes the industry (Bromiley, 1991; Lant 1992).
Companies with performance below industry averages will aspire to outperform those
averages, while companies with performance above industry averages will tend to
improve very little, if at all (Lant, 1992). High aspirations, caused by performance o f the
peer group, lead to new strategies that are generally assumed to involve increased risk
levels of companies (Bromiley, 1991), thus

Hypothesis 4. Investment banks with higher aspirations will be associated with
higher corporate risk-taking, as compared to investment banks with lower
aspirations.

Aspiration level depends on two kinds o f comparison: comparison to the firm’s
own past and comparison to the relevant others (Cyert & March, 1963). Because this
model depends on both comparison to the company’s past and comparison to relevant
others, the risk function is assumed to be non-linear. In general, risk taking increases as
companies fall more and more below the industry norms. For companies that outperform
the norms, risk taking is purely a function o f relative past performance (Lant, 1992).

Behavioral theory o f the firm is relevant to investment banking because one o f the
effects o f deregulation was newly set high aspirations that were coming from past
performance and observations of performance of peer group banks; thus, aspirations in
investment banks were forcing executives to increase corporate risk-taking. Behavioral
theory o f the firm led to organizational learning theory (Argote & Greve, 2007; Huber,
1991; Miner & Mezias, 1996), as well as evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter,
2002). The organizational learning and knowledge part of it will be analyzed in the next
chapter o f this dissertation.
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2.5 Level HI: Resources and Knowledge

So far we have seen that the more general macro perspective o f industry view
partially explains the predisposition to corporate risk-taking. A more focused view of
companies’ aspirations also partially explains corporate risk-taking. What about corporate
resources? Research suggests that companies with more resources of a particular type, for
instance, financial resources like liquid assets, can employ more sophisticated risk
management systems and are perceived as less risky (Venter, 2009). Not only do
financial resources allow companies to employ more sophisticated risk management
systems, but also the simple presence o f liquid assets like cash sends a signal that the
company will not have short-term solvency issues (Rochet, 1999). This section will start
with the history of resource based view, then the evolution of resource based view into
knowledge based view will be discussed, and a set o f hypotheses will be introduced.

A number of researchers follow Ricardian perspective (Ricardo, 1817), which was
later developed into a “resource-based view,” which argues that picking the right
resources is the main way to generate economic wealth (Barney, 1986a, b, 1991; Mata,
Fuerst, & Barney, 1995; Penrose, 1959). According to the Ricardian work, variations in
performance are attributed to ownership o f resources that have a degree o f difference in
productivity, or as Ricardo puts it: “original, unaugmentable, and indestructible gifts of
Nature” (Ricardo, 1817). Most o f these early studies focused on economic aspects of
owning land (Barney & Arikan, 2001). Because the supply of land is fixed and does not
fluctuate depending on changes in price, demand for land as a factor o f production is
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totally inelastic (Hirshleifer, 1958). This inelastic supply allows owners o f land to enjoy
an economic rent, i.e. a payment to the owner of the factor o f production in excess of the
cost of the factor (Hirshleifer, 1958; Hirshleifer, Glazer, & Hirshleifer, 2005).

The foundations o f the resource-based view are attributed to the industrial
organizational economist Edith Penrose (1959), who in her book The Theory o f the
Growth o f the Firm argues that a firm is a “bundle of resources.” Penrose, acknowledging

that companies operate in the environments where attracting human and financial capital
is a constant struggle, takes the analytical framework inside the firm to understand what
principles govern corporate growth. Penrose (1959) suggests that the principles of the
firms’ growth are rooted in the excess resources and argues that corporate expansion is a
natural process when companies have excess resources, while absence o f resources may
be the largest limiting factor to growth. Penrose (1959) suggests that along with being
viewed as bundles o f resources, companies should also be viewed as administrative
systems linking and coordinating the efforts of many individuals. According to Penrose
(1959), the main task of managers is to use the bundle of resources under the company’s
control via the employment of the administrative framework that exists in the company.
Limitations for the company’s growth lie in (1) the productive opportunities that are
present as a function of the bundle of productive resources under the company’s control,
and (2) the administrative system in place to coordinate the employment o f these
resources (Penrose, 1959).

Penrose (1959) makes two main contributions to organizational science; first she proposes that firms can combine resources in different ways, and second - she
outlines that resources have a lumpiness element to them, and that lumpiness leads to

excesses that drive companies’ growth. While developing RBV, Penrose (1959) proposes
that: (1) bundles o f resources can vary significantly among firms —making firms even
within one industry heterogeneous, (2) productive resource should have a broad
definition - thus moving from a Ricardian focus on land, and adding managerial teams,
groups of top executives and entrepreneurial abilities, and (3) admitting that even within
extended typologies there are more sources of corporate heterogeneity. Penrose (1959)
views entrepreneurial abilities as one of the productive resources, arguing that some
managers are more resourceful, able to fund-raise better, have more ambition, and
possess stronger cognitive skills to exercise better judgment than other managers. Penrose
(1959) explains possible motivations for diversification as an excess capacity and
provides rationale for the direction of diversification. While she describes in some detail
how resources lead or constrain the growth process of companies, she never addressed
how fast growth can happen, or what companies can do to expedite growth.

The question of how firms come to own resources with heterogeneous
productivity levels remained open for quite some time. It was addressed in ‘strategic
factor market’ theory (Barney, 1986b). The gist of that theory is that there is only one
non-random and methodical way for a company to come to own the set o f resources
capable o f creating higher than average levels o f return: the company should possess
resource-picking skill superior to its competitors (Barney, 1986b). This can be done by
developing methodically more precise expectations about the future value o f resources
than other players in the resource market (Barney, 1986b). One important inference of
Ricardian based theory is that the decisions related to creating economic rent take place
before the acquisition of resources. So, companies either have superior resource-picking
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skill or possess unique information about the resources. Resource-based view emphasizes
company-specific capabilities and assets and the existence of dividing devices as the
basic determinants of company performance (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Birger,
1984; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984). Resource-based view recognizes the nature of the
isolating devices that allow entrepreneurial returns and competitive advantage to be
unrelenting (Birger, 1984).

Daft (1983) puts forward the idea that resources include not only capital, labor
and machinery, but also various organizational processes, capabilities, firm attributes,
information, knowledge, procedures and methods of doing things within the company
that enable the organization to develop strategies geared toward improvement of
efficiency and effectiveness. Wemerfelt (1984) argues that a company’s competitive
advantage is based on and is a direct function of the application of the bundle of
resources that are valuable and under that firm’s direct control.

Barney (1991) puts forward the idea that in order to have sustainable competitive
advantage, companies need to possess special resources, and those resources must be:
(1) heterogeneous in nature - if resources are homogeneous, they will not provide
substantial advantage to the company; and (2) not-perfectly mobile - if resources are
easily mobile, then it will be possible for other companies to move needed resources from
other locations.

In that same paper Barney (1991) developed VRIN framework,

suggesting that not all resources would lead to competitive advantage but only those that
are: (1) valuable - in order to provide competitive advantage resources should possess
value; (2) rare - those resources should be rare, meaning that the number o f those who
want to possess them must be higher than the available resources; (3) inimitable - it
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should be hard to imitate those resources for competitors by means o f backward
engineering, etc.; (4) non-substitutable - there should not be strategic substitutes o f those
resources. Barney (1991) argues that strategic substitutes can have two forms: (1) similar
resources - one type o f plastic similar to another; and (2) strategic substitutes composite material can be a strategic substitute to metal, or sun energy can be a strategic
substitute to oil energy, if the price of those energy types will be comparable.

Priem and Butler (2001) criticize Barney’s framework, suggesting that resourcebased view is a theory o f sustainability and not a theory of competitive advantage. They
argue that resource-based view is: (1) tautological and self-satisfying; (2) has circular
logic which makes it operationally invalid; (3) different combinations o f resources can
produce the same outcome and thus be competitive advantage; (4) not a theory of
competitive advantage, but a theory of sustainability; (5) the effect o f product markets are
not developed enough; and (6) it lacks a dynamic element, giving it few prescriptive
implications. Barney (2001) responds to Priem and Butler’s (2001) criticisms, stating
that: (1) using the logic of Priem and Butler it can be shown that any strategic
management theory is tautological and has circular logic; and (2) equifmality - Barney
argued that if different combinations of resources produce the same output, they by
definition are not valuable and become homogeneous (since there is an infinite number of
combinations to achieve that), and that his theory deals with heterogeneous resources,
and (3) Barney agrees that not enough work has been done in the dynamic aspect and
suggests that more studies should be undertaken.

Nair, Trendowski, and Judge (2008) criticized resource-based view for the lack
o f testability, suggesting that to develop theoretical principles and establish logical
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connections, mostly histories were used. Researchers emphasized that testing resourcebased view remains problematic because constructs such as entrepreneurship and
management are defined too broadly (Nair et al., 2008).

Barney and Aakan (2001) conduct a meta analysis and review all empirical testing
of resource-based view. They studied 166 research papers and concluded that only four
were not supporting resource-based view, and the remaining 162 (or almost 98%) were
supporting resource-based view. Newbert (2007) decides to check the above assertion of
Barney and Aakan. He conducts a more refined search o f articles based on keywords
such as: Barney, resource-based view, VRIN, etc. He also adds 12 additional key words
and searches for articles in major management journals using AIB/Inform. In addition,
Newberg hires proofreaders to thoroughly check if the selected articles are within the
resource-based view frame. He ends up with a sample of 55 articles and 87 statistical
tests/sets. His findings were more humble, suggesting that only 53% o f articles actually
supported resource-based view, and that the extent of that support varies.

2.5.1 Knowledge as a Resource and a Capability

Resource-based view led to development of dynamic capabilities framework
(Teece 1997, Makadok 2001). While dynamic capabilities explain competitive advantage
in high-velocity environments, researchers are still arguing on what to include into this
construct; some suggest the product development routines of Toyota or the design
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routines o f IDEO, and how to measure them (Please see Appendix B). Due to the very
nature of dynamic capabilities in highly competitive and fast changing environments they
have the ability to improvise, which makes studying them yet harder (Vibert, 2004).

There were also interesting works linking resource-based view to capabilities in
general, with capabilities lifecycle or CLC framework. This framework suggests that
there can be dynamic resources which are different from dynamic capabilities.

There were some research works which challenged Ricardian perspective by
Schumpeterian perspective (Schumpeter, 1950), which some authors believe was later
developed into “dynamic capabilities view” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dierickx &
Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Schumpeterian dynamic capability framework
draws attention to the significance of the alternative return generating system capability-building - which has several distinctions from resource-picking. To make the
discussion of ‘resource’ and ‘capability’ clear, let us review some definitions. Amit and
Schoemaker (1993) referred to dynamic capabilities as: “A firm’s capacity to deploy
resources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end.
They are information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific and
are developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s resources. They
can abstractly be thought of as ‘intermediate goods’ generated by the firm to provide
enhanced productivity of its resources, as well as strategic flexibility and protection for
its final product or service.”

There are two main attributes distinguishing all other types o f resources from a
capability. First, the capability is company-specific, and it is rooted in organizational
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processes, while other resources may not be. And because o f this rootedness, capability
may not be easily transferable from one firm to the other without also transferring
ownership of the firm, or at least a self-contained subsidiary of the organization. In this
regard, Teece et al. (1997a) stated: “that which is distinctive cannot be bought and sold
short of buying the firm itself, or one or more of its subunits.” This suggests that if the
company was to entirely disappear its resources can be preserved in the hands o f new
owners while its capabilities would also dissolve. For instance, if AMD Corporation
disappeared, then its microprocessor patents would continue to exist and would just
change owners, but its skill in designing new architecture o f processors would vanish.
AMD Corporation could easily transfer the rights of its microprocessor patents to a
different corporation, but it cannot easily transfer the capability or the skill of devising
new processors, unless it was willing to lose a core part of itself. The second distinctive
attribute o f a capability is to improve the efficiency of other resources that the company
possesses - or so-called ‘intermediate goods’ equivalence (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).
This distinction between a resource and capability is similar to distinctions between
‘systemic’ and ‘discrete’ resources (Miller & Shamsie, 1996), or

‘elementary’ and

‘higher-level’ resources (Brumagin, 1994), or ‘traits’ and ‘configurations’ (Black & Boal,
1994).

An important distinction between resource-picking and capability-building is
timing. The resource-picking mechanism creates economic profits before the acquisition
o f resources. On the contrary, capability-building generates economic rent after the
resources are possessed. And no matter how great a company’s capabilities are, if the
company fails to obtain needed resources it will not be able to utilize its capabilities.

Resource-based view evolved into knowledge-based view, which argues that
knowledge, both implicit and explicit, contributes to a company’s performance (Grant,
1996a). Knowledge-based view, according to some researchers, is the special case of
resource-based view, and that is one o f the criticisms of knowledge-based view (Felin &
Hesterly, 2007; Vibert, 2004). Via knowledge-based view, resource-based view can be
linked to transaction cost economics in the sense that knowledge, which is a particular
type of resource, can substantially decrease transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985;
Williamson, 1981), and full knowledge on the side o f principal can reduce agency
problem, thus linking to agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen, 1983; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).

Resource-based view explains diversification strategy well when attention is
moved from product-market participants, including customers, suppliers and rivals, to the
resource base o f the company, such as financial capital, labor, technology, etc. Resourcebased view outlines limitations for the corporate growth, arguing that available resources
and managerial talent might be limiting possibilities of market entries or administering
effective growth (Amit & Wemerfelt, 1990). Resource-based view clarifies motivation
for diversification, arguing that it is excessive capacity and unused productive facilities
(Penrose, 1959). If excessive capacity drives diversification, then by measuring how
diversified a company is we can establish if that company has slack in its system.

The slack o f resources in the system, while providing an opportunity to grow via
diversification, would also lead to a sense o f safety among managers, thus making them
act in more risk loving ways in certain divisions, particularly ones exhibiting aggressive
risk culture, such as investment banking (Ang, 1991). Resource-based view predicts that
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the vector o f diversification depends on the quantity and nature of resources available to
the firm. Different quantities and bundles of resources may push companies toward either
related or unrelated diversification (Chatterjee & Wemerfelt, 1991; Montgomery &
Hariharan, 1991). Thus, companies with larger resource bases are more likely to go for
unrelated diversification than companies that have lower resource bases.

Resource-based view, along with transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1979, 1998)

and industrial organizational economics

(Bain, 1956; Caves, 1964; Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980) contributed to the development of
diversification theory. Resource-based view is used as one of the tools to analyze
formations of joint ventures and alliances directly or through the knowledge-based view.
Resource-based view is applied and used in conjunction with the network theory (Uzzi,
1996, 1997) in the sense that position within networks with higher centrality score, or
access to certain networks, can provide various resources (Tolbert, Simons, Andrews, &
Rhee, 1995).
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2.5.2 Knowledge-Based View

Rooted in the resource-based view, knowledge-based view develops the idea of
Penrose that a firm is a bundle of resources (Penrose, 1959) and emphasizes knowledge
as a key aspect o f growth and prosperity. Specifically, knowledge-based view proposes
the idea that the firm’s skills at combining knowledge facilitate sustainable growth and
development (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1993). Knowledge-based view is
built on the idea that knowledge is a firm’s most important resource (Grant, 1996b). The
firm's existence and boundaries can be explained via its unique ability to obtain, build,
combine, and retain knowledge (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1993,
1996).
Why is knowledge based view applicable to investment banking? Investment
banks diversified due to deregulation, but many lacked knowledge o f the markets that
they entered, in particular, knowledge of the architecture o f CDOs and real estate market
securities (Griffin & Tang, 2011; Longstaff & Rajan, 2008). It is argued that investment
banks that had more experience in the new markets accumulated the necessary
knowledge and thus were able to operate in a manner that was safer. One should note that
investment banks are hierarchical in nature. Hierarchical organizations are particularly
effective for building and combining knowledge, and thereby developing “path
dependent” capabilities and knowledge assets (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2001). A firm's
distinctive competencies and capabilities are important sources o f value creation over
time (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). As such, it is expected that
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investment banks that diversified after deregulation into new markets lacked expertise in
such markets and therefore would be subject to higher risks.

Hypothesis 5. Investment banks that were more diversified, w ill assume more
corporate risk.

One outcome of deregulation (as discussed earlier) was the entry o f banks into
real estate market due to the growth in these markets. Investment bank entry into these
markets was usually through the launch of or investment in real estate investment trusts
(REITs) (Frank & Ghosh, 2012; Gyamfi-Yeboah, Ling, & Naranjo, 2012). Knowledge
can be a source o f a firm’s competitive advantage (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002;
Dunning, 2001), and banks that were diversified into (and had knowledge of real estate)
would enjoy competitive advantage. However, many of the firms that had diversified
into real estate investments within investment banking did not possess knowledge o f real
estate, therefore it is expected that they would be taking on more risk. This is clear from
evidence that some investment banks that have had operations with securities related to
real estate for a long time, had accumulated knowledge and better understanding o f that
particular market (Chang & Chan, 2011).
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Hypothesis 6. Investment banks that were diversified into diversified REIT9, will
assume more corporate risk, as compared to investment banks that were not.

2.5.3 Knowledge is 'Sticky'

Alfred Marshal, in his comparison of nations, suggested that economic activity
was drawn to regions rich in the “atmosphere” of knowledge (Marshall, 1920). Search for
knowledge spillovers made substantial success by finding statistical evidence that
companies’ productivity was linked if those companies were near outstanding universities
and other sources o f scientific discovery - geographically-localized spillovers of
knowledge (Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 1998a). Geographically-localized knowledge
spillovers were flourishing near great universities, but the presence o f outstanding
scientists as measured by research productivity was a crucial factor over, above and
independent from the presence o f those schools and availability o f government research
funding to them (Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998b). Those outstanding researchers called
‘stars’ are the scientists who are capable

of inventing and

commercializing

breakthroughs, and by living in a particular place, they create a geographically-localized
knowledge cluster.

Neo-institutional theory suggests that by being in close proximity to universities
where forward-looking research is taking place, employees o f local companies will be the

9 REIT stands for real estate investment trust, or a business entity deriving value from securities
or derivatives whose underlying value is a function o f the value o f real estate.
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first to be exposed to important discoveries and thus be able to use them before others
(Zucker et al., 1998b). In a similar fashion, knowledge containing dynamic capabilities
will be preserved near places with a high concentration of corporate headquarters. One
o f the limitations o f Zucker’s model (1998) is that breakthrough information is treated as
a public good, when in reality it may not be so.
Evidence that knowledge is “sticky,” and stays restrained within narrow spatial
borders, led to the conclusion that plant locations can serve as a major source of
competitive advantage, and companies located in innovative regions had better access to
new technological knowledge than their spatially remote counterparts (Almeida, 1996;
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993).
A contrasting view is that existence o f agglomeration economies will motivate top
firms not to geographically cluster, because companies contribute to and benefit from the
externality in different ways (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). This implies that if companies are
heterogeneous, their net benefit from agglomeration will vary (Chung & Kalnins, 2001).
Therefore, large companies possessing best technologies, human resources, suppliers and
distributors will have an incentive to locate distant from other companies, while smaller
companies are likely to agglomerate (Deeds & Decarolis, 1999).

Reexamination of the empirical evidence on the level of spatial spillover between
research works o f universities and high-technology innovations supported the view that
knowledge is geographically-localized (Anselin, Varga, & Acs, 1997). Anselin et al.
(1997) examined the potential for gravity and covering indices including Jaffe’s
"geographical coincidence index," and argued that there is strong evidence o f local
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spillovers even at a state level. The tacit nature of knowledge leads to technological
opportunity suggesting that the suitability o f knowledge is a key element for the location
of innovation (Feldman, 2000). All this evidence on knowledge stickiness led researchers
to conclude that innovative regions can serve as “magnets” to new investments (Almeida
& Kogut, 1999).

2.5.4 Types o f Knowledge and Time Element

Studies o f organizational knowledge systems have distinguished between
component and architectural knowledge (Tallman, Jenkins, Henry, & Pinch, 2004).
Component knowledge refers to physical aspects of technologies, while architectural
knowledge refers to links and connections between these aspects (Finneran, 1999;
Henderson & Clark, 1990b). Architectural knowledge contains dynamic capabilities and
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) even termed them ‘architectural competence’ (Please refer
to Appendix B). Capabilities are composed of two main knowledge related parts: (1) a
company-specific part and (2) an enhancement of other resources part. The spillovers of
company-specific knowledge are beneficial when companies are very similar, or when
competitors engage in business intelligence, and a high quantity o f company-specific
information is used as a competitive tool for strategic decision-making (Liautaud, 2000;
Luhn, 2010).

Increasing knowledge intensity, which can be manifested in capacity for R&D,
has been underlined as one of the differentiating features o f the modem competitive
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landscape (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Teece, 1982). The primary goal o f R&D is to generate
new knowledge by recombining knowledge that exists (Fleming, 2001; Henderson &
Cockbum, 1994; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Geographically-localized spillover effects of
local universities on the prosperity of nearby enterprise R&D efforts was found to be
positive and significant (Jaffe, 1989).
“Soft” versus “hard” knowledge within investment banks is pertinent to other
business functions such as R&D, where informal, also called “soft,” information
exchanges are crucial (Jaffe et al., 1993). The division between soft and hard information
is significant in the incentives literature, providing clarification for the division of
management and production. Namely, division is possibly a commitment device to
examine the agent less intensively and increase his initiative (Aghion & Tirole, 1997).
White-collar networking o f investment bankers with consultants and lawyers consists of
information intensive exchanges, which are further examples o f “soft” information
(Holmes, 2005; Holmes & Stevens, 2004). For exchanges o f “hard,” or easily codified,
information, such as financial reports or various statistical measures, geographic distance
or industry experience is not an essential factor (Cremer, Garicano, & Prat, 2004;
Glaeser, 1999). On the other hand, for exchanges of “soft” information, which contains
industry-specific routines, time is highly important, because it is nearly impossible to
codify that information and make it available for quick transfer. Thus, over time, it is
expected that exchange o f “soft” information would increase expertise o f investment
banks in real estate markets.
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Hypothesis 7. Longer duration o f diversification into diversified REIT by
investment banks will be negatively associated with corporate risk.

Knowledge reconfigurations can be within, across or outside o f organizational
borders (Katila, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Relocations of corporate headquarters
serve

the

desire

by

organizations’ management

to

tap into

the

knowledge

reconfigurations outside o f organizational borders. Various aspects o f knowledge used in
reconfiguration can lead to distinct technological capabilities resulting in different levels
o f performance (Arthur, 1989; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997b).
Research on R&D suggests that companies where research is centralized pursue R&D
that has greater impact on future technological discoveries and spans a wider range of
technological domains than do companies where R&D activities are decentralized
(Argyres & Silverman, 2004). When R&D alliance partners are direct competitors, they
are more likely to restrict their joint activities to ‘pure’ R&D in final product markets.
This is because rivals are particularly reluctant to adding cooperative marketing activities
to their R&D collaborations, implying that the competitive consequences of marketrelated knowledge leakage are a significant concern (Oxley & Sampson, 2003). This
suggests that knowledge which spans beyond R&D and contains dynamic capabilities is
crucial to corporate success.

Research into the management issues o f integration o f various types of
specialized knowledge has been from the new product development perspective (Nonaka
& Takeuchi, 1995). While some innovations are the result o f new knowledge application,
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others are the result of reconfigurations o f existing knowledge to generate “architectural
innovations” (Henderson & Cockbum, 1994; Henderson & Clark, 1990a). “Architectural
innovations” are based on various dynamic capabilities, and relocations o f headquarters
can provide the necessary environments, rich in “architectural innovations.”

2.6 Level IV: Corporate Governance and Agency Theory

One of the main theoretical perspectives that has received significant coverage in
strategic management literature is agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

It has

emerged out o f works of Coase (1937) and Arrow (1965, 1971) as analysis of relations in
economic systems under uncertainty and partial information. Findings and applications
of agency theory are developed and used in research o f executive compensations
(Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Belliveau, O'Reilly III, & Wade, 1996; Boyd, 1994),
corporate governance mechanisms (Cuervo, 2002; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Walsh
& Kosnik, 1993), corporate risk (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998), corporate performance (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000; Donaldson &
Davis, 1991; Li & Simerly, 1998), decisions to diversify corporations (Fox & Hamilton,
1994; Kochhar, 1996; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997), and decisions to merge (Holl &
Kyriazis, 1997; Lane, Cannella Jr, & Lubatkin, 1998; Reuer & Insead, 1997) . There are
many more studies arguing that corporate governance has direct effects on company risk
(Holm & Laursen, 2007; Lee & Yeh, 2004). Examples of changes to risk can be
differences in decision-making when the CEO is or is not the chairman o f the board, and
various perceptions by investors related to this phenomena (MacCrimmon & Wehrung,
1990). Global financial crisis risk management practices are becoming more imperative
for top executives, because one of the reasons for the current crisis seem to be the lack of
profound comprehension of risk in executive decision-making (Ladd, 2008; Lo, 2009).
Massive failure of the largest and most sophisticated financial institutions in the United
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States has illustrated that corporate governance systems were ineffective in successful
mitigation o f risks (Bebchuk, 2008).

The origins of agency theory date back to the 1960s when economists studied
risk-sharing behavior of individuals and groups (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The underlying
premise o f agency theory is that organizational life and behavior of individuals is rooted
in self-interest (Hendry, 2005). Agency theory explains and attempts to resolve two
problems that arise from principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The first o f the
two problems includes agency problem, which takes place when: (1) there is a conflict
between goals o f the agent and the principal (Sappington, 1991), and costs of monitoring
the agent's actions are high for the principal (Varian, 1990). This means that it is very
hard for the principal to verify if the agent is acting in the principal’s best interest
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). The second problem is the problem o f risk-sharing, which arises
from the differences in risk tolerance levels between the agent and the principal (Grable,
2000; Sung & Hanna, 1996). This means that even when the goals o f principal and agent
are aligned, differences in risk tolerance levels would dictate different preferences in
decision-making for principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a). In an attempt to resolve
these problems agency theory tries to design an optimal contract, which must be efficient
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). There are two main types of contracts: behavior-oriented contracts,
including merit pay such as salaries (Sturges, Conway, Guest, & Liefooghe, 2005), and
outcome-oriented contracts, including commissions, stock option packages and profit
sharing arrangements (Ng, Maull, & Yip, 2009; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996).

Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that there is natural conflict in all
corporations -

the conflict of principal and agent. This conflict is caused by the
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separation o f ownership from control, and this separation leads to opportunistic behavior
o f executives (Lie, 2005). Prevention o f opportunistic behavior o f executives can be
achieved via implementation of monitoring devices that ensure that managers do not
ignore their fiduciary duty and act in the best interest o f the owners o f corporation (Lui,
Wong, & Liu, 2009; Tripsas, Schrader, & Sobrero, 1995).

One o f the main contributions of agency theory to organizational thinking is that
it treats information as a commodity that can be bought and sold (Braunstein, 1981).
Implications of the commodity-like nature o f information are that companies can invest
in development o f information systems that will limit opportunism on behalf o f the agent
(Eisenhardt, 1989a).

The next key contribution o f agency theory, which treats

organizations as entities with an uncertain future, is the risk implications for the future
(Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998). Uncertainty in this context refers to the tradeoff between
risk and reward and is unrelated to the ability of the corporation to plan (Eisenhardt &
Brown, 1998). Barney and Ouchi (1986), under agency theory, emphasized how capital
markets may affect the firm. Agency theory assumes the pursuit o f self-interest at the
individual level and goal conflict at the organizational level (Eisenhardt, 1989b).

Since the analysis focuses on the contract between principal and agent, the theory
tries to define the most efficient contract arrangement (Lyons, 1996). Rooted in
economics, agency theory, according to Jensen (1983), developed along two directions:
positivist and principal-agent. Both streams, as a unit of analysis, take the contract
between a principal and an agent. Positivist agency theory focuses on defining situations
where principal-agent conflict may take place and then prescribing governance
mechanisms that will minimize agents’ self-serving behavior (Nilakant & Rao, 1994).

The positivist stream o f research is less mathematical and focuses on the governance
mechanism (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). The positivist stream was enhanced by researchers
asking what the agency theory contributes to organizational theory, and the common
solution is to identify the situation where interests of stockholders and executives do not
align and then to show that information systems or outcome-based incentives solve the
agency problem (Ross & Liu, 2009).

The principal-agent research stream employs abstract mathematics and logical
proof of outcomes, and due to this mathematical rigor, this stream is less accessible to
organizational scholars (Bhattacherjee, 1998). The focus of the principal-agent literature
is on determining the optimal contract under different conditions and a multitude of
assumptions that change with the levels o f uncertainty (Nilakant & Rao, 1994), risk
aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and availability of information (Bamberg &
Spremann, 1989). The principal-agent research stream is more directly focused on the
contract between principal and agent, and the underlying assumption is that parties
should choose the most efficient contract (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The common approach is
to take a subset o f agency variables like task programmability (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, &
Reilly, 1996), sophistication of the information system (Eisenhardt, 1985; Gurbaxani &
Whang, 1991), and outcome uncertainty to predict if the contract is behavior-based or
outcome-based (Eisenhardt, 1988).
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2.6.1 Wider View on Agency Theory and its Links

Agency theory is linked with other theories in strategic management. Transaction
cost economics and agency theory linked in the sense that agency problem increases
certain transaction costs, and so acts as friction in the economic development (Beccerra &
Gupta, 1999; Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Agency theory has many similarities with the
transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981, 1998). As noted by
Barney and Ouchi (1986), the theories share assumptions o f self-interest and bounded
rationality. They also have similar dependent variables; that is, hierarchies roughly
correspond to behavior-based contracts, and markets correspond to outcome-based
contracts. Examples o f transaction costs are costs of monitoring agents behavior (Frey,
1993) and costs o f designing an optimal contract (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990).

Agency theory assumes that individuals are bounded rationally and that
information is distributed asymmetrically (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967); they both use
efficient processing o f information as a criterion for choosing among various organizing
forms (Galbraith, 1973). Thompson's (1967) and later Ouchi's (1979) linking means/ends
relationships and focused goals to behavior versus outcome control is very similar to
agency theory's linking task programmability and measurability of outcomes to contract
form (Eisenhardt, 1985).

The main idea of the agency theory literature is that the separation o f ownership
and control leads to opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Most empirical
studies in agency theory analyze the separation o f ownership from management, using

secondary data that is available for larger corporations

(Bass, Bass, & Bass, 2008).

Empirical works provide support for the contract between the principal and an agent with
(a) information systems (Conlon & Parks, 1990; Eccles, 1983; Parks & Conlon, 1995),
(b) outcome uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988; Nilakant & Rao, 1994), (c) outcome
measurability (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985), (d) time
(Camevale & Conlon, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992), and (e) task programmability (Eccles,
1983; Eisenhardt, 1985; Stroh et al., 1996). Moreover, this support rests on research using
a variety

o f methods

including

questionnaires,

secondary

sources,

laboratory

experiments, and interviews. The common approach in these studies is to use a subset of
agency variables such as task programmability, information systems, and outcome
uncertainty to predict whether the contract is behavior- or outcome-based. The underlying
assumption is that principals and agents will choose the most efficient contract, although
efficiency is not directly tested (Eisenhardt, 1989a).

Agency theory is linked with new institutional economics because most principalagent conflicts take place in settings where a principal-agent relationship exists, and one
of such settings is investment banks (Williamson, 2000).

2.6.2 Board o f Directors Background

Agency theory portrays managers as agents who are self-interested and for that
reason should be closely monitored (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
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Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003).

Agency theory suggests that boards o f directors

influence strategic decision-making by preventing executives from acting selfishly at the
expense of owners (Mizruchi, 1983). From this perspective, boards are not initiating and
implementing strategies, but rather enhancing the welfare o f stockholders by endorsing
and monitoring strategic decision-making (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Goodstein, Gautam, &
Boeker, 1994; Jensen & Fama, 1983).

During the last several decades the corporate governance system worldwide has
been undergoing a substantial change (Pugliese et al., 2009). First, the globalization of
the world economy, then, the liberalization of financial systems, followed by numerous
scandals involving board members, culminating in financial crisis, resulting in stronger
accountability and transparency, have placed the functions o f the board o f directors at the
core of the corporate governance debate (Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Ingley & Van
der Walt, 2001; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). The appropriate level of involvement o f boards
remains a question, even though society is pushing for increasing that involvement
(Pugliese et al., 2009).

In general, both scholars and practitioners recognize the

importance o f adequate board control and board independence (Baysinger & Hoskisson,
1990; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Westphal, 1998).

However, when it comes to strategic

decision-making, the level of optimal board involvement remains controversial (Daily,
Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).

In the 1970s boards of directors in the United States were criticized for being
passive and not preventing corporate failures (Pugliese et al., 2009).

The public

demanded that boards take a more active strategic role in order to restore confidence
(Clendenin, 1972; Heller & Milton, 1972; Mace, 1976; Machin & Wilson, 1979; Pugliese

et al., 2009; Vance, 1979). This led to corporate governance reforms that brought board
members closer to strategic decision-making (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004;
Enrione, Mazza, & Zerboni, 2006; Sheridan, Jones, & Marston, 2006). As the power of
institutional investors increased, boards were moved even closer to the strategic decision
making aspect o f business (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, &
Grossman, 2002; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). For the first time in history, boards were
starting to challenge CEOs and become even more involved in strategy, a purely CEOdominated domain in the past (Monks, 2008; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve, & Hu,
2006; Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006). Over time, more and more studies suggest that
board members are becoming more aware of their role in strategic decisions (Demb &
Neubauer, 1992; Heracleous, 2001a, b; Huse, 2005). Yet, researchers pinpoint multiple
disagreements in empirical studies and a wealth o f inconclusive evidence defining the
relationship between boards and strategic decisions (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson,
1998; Deutsch, 2005; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996).

From one side of research

works, boards were shown to be passive and at the mercy of CEOs’ dominance and
executives’ decisions (Herman, 1981; Kosnik, 1987; Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Mace,
1971). There is also evidence that under certain conditions boards may demolish value
when becoming involved directly in strategic decision-making (Fulghieri & Hodrick,
2006; Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001; Jensen, 1993). Many scholars have shown that the
role of the boards in strategic decision-making is becoming more active and involved
(Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006; Zahra,
1990; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). There is also empirical evidence that boards defined
certain elements o f strategic decision-making, some of which are: (1) the scope o f the
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firm (Jensen & Zajac, 2004; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003); (2) levels of
innovative activities and entrepreneurship (Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998; Hoskisson et
al., 2002; Zahra, Neubaum, & Huse, 2000); (3) strategic transformations and adjustments
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt,
1993); (4) strategies for research and development (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991;
Kor, 2006); and (5) corporate internationalization (Datta, Rajagopalan, & Zhang, 2003;
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).

The above empirical inconclusiveness makes including

boards in this study even more interesting.

2.6.4 Size o f the Board o f Directors

Size of the board o f directors simply means the number o f people on the board
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b), and this structural variable has been studied extensively with
ambiguous findings (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Group dynamics literature provides some
answers for this ambiguity. It is empirically shown that large groups may suffer from
difficulties with group organization, group control (Hackman & Morris, 1974, 1983) and
overall low motivation (Herold, 1979). Increases in group size are negatively associated
with participation of group members (Gladstein, 1984). This result was replicated in a
business setting in a study of Fortune 500 boards, where larger boards were found to be
too bulky for effective communication and discussion (Herman, 1981). An analogous
finding was with hospital boards, where larger ones were ineffective and delayed the
speed o f strategic decision-making (Kovner, 1985). Decision-making speed was

increased while individual commitment o f members was substantially reduced in
oversized boards (Lauenstein, 1977; Reed, 1978). Other studies pointed out that it is more
costly for large boards to monitor growth (Jensen, 1993). Similarly, board size was
shown to be negatively related to growth opportunities (Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2009).
Board size and independence decrease with the cost of monitoring and advising (Linck,
Netter, & Yang, 2008). In personal interviews o f 114 board members accompanied by
archival data, board size was negatively related to the board’s involvement, while board
involvement was positively related to financial performance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992a).
Thus, board size may slow down active participation by members o f the board, reduce
effectiveness o f strategic decision-making, and have a generally negative effect on group
dynamics; for that very reason, risk-taking tendencies are argued to increase.

Hypothesis 8. The size o f the boards o f directors o f investment banks w ill be
positively associated with corporate risk-taking.

2.6.4 Board o f Directors Interlocks

Why did board interlocks matter in investment banking? Social network ties,
including board interlock ties, channel social influence as well as information (Burt,
1995; Davis, 1991; Walker, 1985). More connected boards are exposed to more
knowledge, political power, and more pressure for higher performance (Hillman, 2005;

Pennings, 1980). In the literature interlocking ties and firm performance had either: (1)
no association (Pennings, 1980), (2) positive association (Berkowitz, Carrington,
Kotowitz, & Waverman, 1979; Burt, 1983), or (3) negative association (Fligstein &
Brantley, 1992). The study of total quality management-related innovations in public
hospitals demonstrated that both top executives and their networks determine whether
companies adopt innovative strategy (Young, Chams, & Shortell, 2001). Interlocking
directorships are the essence o f strategic power increases. These connections allow
companies to align with other powerful entities in their environment. These connections
also permit access to specific knowledge that is circulated in top management teams of
other companies, and presence o f that knowledge creates an illusion that board members
are more aware o f trends and can make better decisions. Board members who are
interlocked extensively are able to make comparisons between the companies on board of
which they sit. Thus, not only interlocking connections provide information, they also put
pressure on the board members to push the company to perform better.

Hypothesis 9. Investment banks with more interlocked boards w ill be associated
with higher corporate risk-taking.
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2.6.5 Board o f Directors Shares and Voting Power

A board of directors with more voting power will have stronger influence over
corporate strategy, including corporate risk (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Zald, 1969).

Hypothesis 10.

Voting pow er o f board members o f investment banks w ill be

negatively associated with corporate risk-taking.

Ownership of the stock by various groups is a powerful form o f corporate
governance (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). Ownership structure allows
either aligning or misaligning the interests of various stakeholder groups (Daily et al.,
2003). The relationship between the ownership of the stock o f top executives and
organizational performance usually shows that firms with larger ownership do not
outperform firms with lower ownership. Ownership of the stock by the board of directors
can be an effective antitakeover tactic and depending on the situation can support either
agency or stewardship theories (Malekzedeh, McWilliams, & Sen, 2011). It is argued that
board ownership influences corporate strategy, firm performance and governance
processes (Connelly et al., 2010). More specifically ownership o f the stock by board
members is perceived by investors as an indicator o f companies long-term earnings
(Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Therefore,

75

Hypothesis 11. Ownership o f stock by board members o f investment banks w ill
be positively associated with corporate risk-taking.

2.6.6 Insiders on Board o f Directors

The ratio o f insider representation on the board is by far the most widely used
variable in corporate governance (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). Insiders are defined as
“board members who are current or former employees of a firm or who are otherwise
closely affiliated with the firm” (Cochran, Wood, & Jones, 1985).

Over the last few

decades society put pressure on corporations to limit the number o f insider directors on
the boards, assuming the outsiders perform monitoring and oversight functions better
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). Some researchers provided evidence that the number of
insiders on the boards decreased from 31 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 1989 (Heidrick
& Struggles, 1990). Scholars observing this decline mostly speculated on how insider
representation impacts the behavior o f the boards, and empirical results were mostly
ambiguous (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Some researchers argued that insiders benefit boards
by being more aware o f valuable information and insights and bringing them to the
board’s discussions (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Other scholars argued that there
should be a balance between informed discussants o f strategic choices and impartial
monitors o f strategic decision-making (Rosenstein, 1987).

Further, there is some
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empirical evidence in the literature suggesting that there should be internal balance. No
study analyzed how number of insiders is associated with corporate risk-taking.
Analysis o f Inc. 500 companies’ suggested that insider representation was
positively related to board involvement in the strategic decision-making process (Ford,
1988). Higher ratio of insiders was positively correlated with involvement o f the board in
strategic planning, thus making strategic planning more effective (Lauenstein, Tashakori,
& Boulton, 1983). Higher ratio of insiders is positively associated with levels of strategic
change (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991), levels of R&D expenses in the company (Baysinger
et al., 1991), and levels o f strategic innovativeness (Hill & Snell, 1988). Ratio of insiders
was negatively associated with number o f cases when golden parachute strategies were
used in Fortune 500 companies (Cochran et al., 1985) and with quality o f strategic
decision-making (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992b). All these empirical works argue that
improved information flows that higher numbers of insiders provide make boards of
directors more effective in some cases while less effective in others. Unlike outsiders
who may not be as directly impacted by firm performance and failure, insiders’ closer
ties to firm outcomes may be make them more risk averse. Overall, I expect that
increased number o f insiders will lower firm risk:

Hypothesis 12. Number o f insiders on board o f investment banks w ill be
negatively associated with corporate risk-taking.
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3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Sample

A sample o f financial institutions was obtained from Thomson One Financial
database. Initially, data representing Security Brokers and Dealers was extracted, this
data set corresponds to SIC code 621 (Security Brokers and Dealers) and the set includes
135 publicly traded United States-based companies.

A larger set o f 267 companies

corresponding to SIC10 code 62 (Security and Commodity Brokers) was also retrieved
and analyzed. However, after preliminary analysis, a data set based on GIC codes was
extracted from Thomson One Financial Database. GIC11 code, being a newer and more
advanced classification system (Boni & Womack, 2006), seemed to deliver a cleaner set.
In GIC set under the umbrella code o f 40 (Financials) the database produces 1507
publicly traded companies. This set included a subset o f interest for this study called
Diversified Financials that consists of 252 publicly traded companies with database code
4020. The set Diversified Financials, in turn, consists o f three subsets: (1) a subset o f 50
10 The Standard Industrial Classification was replaced by the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) starting in 1997, but several data sets are still available with SICbased data. Both SIC and NAICS classify establishments by their primary type of activity.
" The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is an industry taxonomy developed by
MSCI and Standard & Poor's (S&P) for use by the global financial community. The GICS
structure consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries and 154 sub-industries into
which S&P has categorized all major public companies. The system is similar to ICB (Industry
Classification Benchmark), a classification structure maintained by Dow Jones Indexes and FTSE
Group. GICS is used as a basis for S&P and MSCI financial market indexes in which each
company is assigned to a sub-industry, and to a corresponding industry, industry group and
sector, according to the definition of its principal business activity. "GICS" is a registered
trademark of McGraw-Hill and is currently assigned to S&P.
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corresponding to Diversified Financial Services with code 402010; (2) a subset o f 63
corresponding to Consumer Finance with code 402020; and (3) a subset of 135
companies corresponding to Capital Markets with database code 402030. GIC codes, due
to being a later development, are generally more logical (Boni & Womack, 2006), have
more consistent ways in naming categories, and, therefore, analysis proceeded with the
set produced by applying GIC codes. During analysis, instead of analyzing only 402030
Capital Markets, which are investment banks, a larger set o f 4020 Diversified Financials
was analyzed as well, yet controversial results suggested that investment banks have
systematic differences from other types of financial institutions, and that differences
cannot be accounted for by means o f statistical methods. The final data set included 135
publicly traded investment banks that operate in the United States (please see Appendix
C).
The sample for the corporate governance part o f the analysis included 47
variables pulled from Directors Legacy and Risk Matrix databases under Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS). Board o f directors’ data was available for 2007 to 2010
for only 41 publicly traded investment banks out o f the sample of 135 the was produced
by Thomson Reuters Financial (please see Appendix E). Data for all three years was
available for 38 investment banks only, and the largest number o f observations was
recorded for the year 2008.
All investment banks in both samples are publicly traded banks. Inclusion of
private investment banks would make this study much more interesting; however, most
investment banks that are private very rarely disclose financial information and
information on board members (Eccles & Crane, 1988; Servaes & Zenner, 1996).
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3.2 Variables and Measures

Research in strategic management was criticized for poor construct measurement
(Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005), and, for this reason, for every theoretical perspective more
than one indicator variable was used; the smallest number is two and the largest is five.
The variables of interest to this study are the corporate risk-taking variable, which
is the dependent variable, and it is standard deviation of free cash flow. Independent
variables include: (1) a deregulation dummy, which was coded as 0 before deregulation
and 1 after deregulation, (2) a deregulation clock variable, that is, an ordinal variable,
corresponding to the number of years since deregulation was introduced; (3) corporate
aspirations as average of the past five years; (4) corporate aspirations as industry average,
i.e. arithmetic mean; (5) diversification as measured with entropy measure; (6)
knowledge of real estate with a dummy, (7) clock variable o f time in the real estate, as
number o f years in that industry; (8) number of interlocking directorships as a sum o f all
interlocks in the board; (9) ownership of the stock as the ratio o f the total number of
shares owned by board members to the total stock outstanding; (10) voting power of
directors as a sum o f voting o f stocks; (11) ratio o f insiders as a percentage o f insiders in
the board; (12) board size as a count of people in the board.
Banking regulation strictness is measured by the index developed by researchers
at IMF12 (Abiad, Detragiache, & Tressel, 2009). Their index was composed to measure
five dimensions o f regulations in banks: (1) interest rate controls; (2) credit controls; (3)

12 International Monetary Fund
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restrictions of competition; (4) state ownership; and (5) supervision o f banks. While this
deregulation variable is more versatile, it is not available for investment banks, and is
used within the umbrella o f the World Bank primarily for state banks’ analysis.
Introduction o f financial deregulation was coded using a dummy variable, and it
is a common way to account for deregulation (Kotha & Nair, 1995; Mezias, 1990;
Winship & Mare, 1984). Mezias (1990) in his study of applied economic models versus
institutional models used dummy variables extensively. A total of seven dummy variables
were used to account for different time periods of Fortune 200 companies switching from
the deferral method o f accounting to the flow-through method from 1962 to 1984. The
dummy variable to account for time was used in the analysis of the Japanese machine
tool industry over 1979 to 1992 (Kotha & Nair, 1995). In that paper, to account for
introduction of the “voluntary restraint agreement” between the United States and Japan,
Kotha and Nair (1995) used the dummy variable. Deregulation was coded as a dummy
variable in other papers, accounting for it as either pre-deregulation or post-deregulation
dummy (Beck et al., 2010; Demyanyk et al., 2007; Reger et al., 1992; Stiroh & Strahan,
2003). Based on all o f these studies deregulation was coded as a dummy variable, pre
deregulation was coded as zero and post-deregulation was coded as one. Along with this,
a clock variable was also used.
Control variables include the size of investment banks measured as In o f assets,
market capitalization and number o f employees of the bank. The first variable is
calculated, while the second one is available at Thomson Reuters one.
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Board o f directors variables were downloaded from Directors Legacy dataset in
WRDS database. Number o f interlocks was a mathematical sum o f individual directors’
presence on other companies’ boards. The number of interlocks ranged from zero to
twenty four. Bank O f America Corporation, Bank O f Hawaii Corporation, Bank O f New
York Mellon Corporation, First Commonwealth Financial Corporation, and SEI
Investments Company had zero interlocks, while Northern Trust Corp had the largest
number o f twenty four interlocks in the board. Average number of interlocks was 8.61.
The data on the number o f directors in the board was extracted from Directors
Legacy dataset in WRDS. The number of directors in the boards varied between seven
and twenty, for the year 2007, and seven and seventeen for the year 2010. The average
number o f board members declined from 12.28 in 2007 to 11.66 in 2010, in fact it
seemed that financial crisis was correlated with the decline o f the number of directors in
the board.
Voting power of directors was an arithmetic sum o f the voting power of each
director individually. The voting power of boards ranged from zero to 34%. Franklin
Resources Inc had the board of directors with the largest voting power. The number of
investment banks where boards had zero voting power ranged from year to year and was
six in 2007, twenty two in 2008, eighteen in 2009 and 2010.
Ownership o f the stock data was available as the number of shares that each
director possessed. Total number o f shares for the board was calculated as an arithmetic
sum. Because every company has different number of shares outstanding, the percentage
o f shares holdings by the board o f directors was calculated. The data for the total number
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o f shares outstanding was downloaded from Reuters stock screen website13, and numbers
were cross referenced with EquitiesTracher.com14 and Yahoo/Finance15. The ownership
o f the company shares ranged from 0.16% in the board of the Regions Financial
Corporation to 36.48% at the board o f the Franklin Resources Inc. The average
ownership of shares by the boards of directors in the sample of 42 investment banks was
5.19%.
The ratio o f independent directors was traced from board affiliation data. In the
database each director can have several affiliations, including being (1) independent; (2)
employed by the company; (3) being linked to the board in some other way, like having
family relations; and (4) being not ascertainable. The number of independent directors
was calculated as an arithmetic sum, and then the ratio of independent directors on the
boards was computed as a percentage. Presence o f independent directors ranged from
50% to 94%. The lowest number o f independent directors was at Raymond James
Financial Inc. The highest number of independent directors was at Suntrust Banks Inc.
Other banks with high ration of independent directors include US Bancorporation with
92%, Northern Trust Corporation with 92%, JP Morgan Chase & Company with 91%,
Intercontinental Exchange Inc with 90%, and Comerica Inc with 90%. The average
number o f independent directors in the dataset was 75.32%.

13 From <http://www.reuters.eom/finance/stocks/overview7svmboNSEIC.Q> accessed on
05/18/2012 at 11:34
14 From < http://www.equitiestracker.com/> accessed on 05/16/2012 at 9:12
15 From < http://finance.vahoo.com/q?s=AMP&ql=l> accessed on 05/16/2012 at 10:44
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3.3 Data Analysis

All the analysis was performed on PASW Statistics16 18. Institutional theory was
tested using ANOVA. Due to the fact that deregulation affected all the banks at the same
time regression could not been used. The results o f the ANOVA suggest that deregulation
had no effect on corporate risk taking. And this is a surprising result. In fact it was such a
surprise, that results were retested using standard deviation o f Earnings, standard
deviation of Earnings Before Interest And Taxes, standard deviation o f Earnings Before
Taxes And Depreciation (Please see the results in Table 3). All these variables are similar
to free cash flow and are used extensively to measure corporate risk-taking, even though
free cash flow is considered to be a more accurate measure, because it cannot be
manipulated as easily as earnings related measures. All the tests were not significant, and
the only conclusion was that deregulation had no immediate effect on corporate risk
taking.
Board of directors’ data was analyzed using multiple linear regressions. The
analysis included lag element, when dependent variable was one year after independent
variable (Please see the results in Table 4). Strong support was found for hypothesis nine
and partial support was found for hypothesis twelve. Year 2007 was an exception, none
o f the results were significant and no hypotheses were supported. The reason for this may
be the fact that current financial crisis started in 2007 and there was a lot o f havoc on the
market. Examination of data showed that year 2007 had only 27 valid cases, while years
2008, 2009 and 2010 had 42 valid cases each. For the year 2008, significant results were
16Also called SPSS
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found for the size o f the board. And when the lag was used, results were significant for
the board size and the ratio of insiders. For the year 2009 and 2010, significant results
were for the board size and ratio of insiders, while when lag was used, the significant
results were found for the board size only. These results suggest that board size
determines corporate risk taking all the time and ratio o f insiders half o f the time. The
number o f interlocks on the boards were not significant in any of the eight tests reported
and in twenty regressions that were performed in total. Stock ownership was highly
correlated with voting rights and both were not statistically significant throughout the
tests.
To test cumulative effect of different theories a model including two variables for
agency theory, three variables for knowledge based view and two variables for behavioral
theory o f the firm was constructed. The number o f independent variables was seven, and
for years 2008, 2009, and 2010 the number of observations was 42. This is within the
guidelines of multivariate data analysis, which prescribes that the data set should be at
least five times as large as the number o f independent variables in the model (Hair,
Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). Hair et al (2006) argued that for statistically
significant results, the minimum data set for the model with seven independent variables
will be thirty five or higher.
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4 RESULTS

Results o f this study indicate that deregulation by itself might not have had an
impact on the corporate risk-taking, however, it created opportunities to take bigger
corporate-risks which many banks started to exploit. Those banks that were taking more
risk were performing better and that created peer pressure, which was measured as
aspirations based on industry. Those aspirations had statistically significant results
however, in year 2010 the sign of the relationship changed. Results o f full model suggest
that in years 2008 and 2009 it was imitative behavior that led to high corporate risktaking. Evidence o f this comes from aspirations based on peers’ variable, called
Aspirations Industry Average, was significant. In year 2010, aspirations based on
industry average variable again was significant but it reversed the sign. This finding
suggests that during times o f crisis and market decline, years 2008 and 2009 in the
model, aspirations based on peer pressure push companies to act in established ways,
those who have positive aspirations, i.e. perform worse than average are prone to take
more risk. In fact, as performance deviates from the average, the propensity to increase
corporate risk-taking goes up. At the same time, companies with negative aspirations, i.e.
companies that are outperforming the industry are not inclined to pursue strategies with
higher corporate risk-taking. However, when market decline stopped and recovery
started, that is years 2010 and 2011 in the model, companies that were performing better
than the industry before, and thus were exhibiting low levels of corporate risk-taking
changed their strategies and started to demonstrate more aggressive corporate risk-taking.
Data suggests that after the crisis, better performing companies, push the limits of
corporate risk-taking, while companies that struggled through the crisis, pursue very safe
strategies with low corporate risk-taking. Another explanation may be the fact that
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government was involved with many investment banks that were on the verge o f going
bankrupt and thus forced them to play safe. Also, TARP money was offered to many
banks, including the ones that performed well during the crisis, thus encouraging
management to use low cost capital and take more risk.
An interesting finding o f the full model was that diversification argument was
partially supported and showed that more diversified investment banks had lower
corporate risk-taking levels. An explanation for this might be that highly diversified
banks operate in many lines of business outside of investment banking, while the
dependent variable, standard deviation of free cash flow, was measuring free cash flow
for the bank as a whole and not distinguishing across different businesses. Portfolio effect
of large number o f businesses has a smoothing effect on income streams, free cash flows
and reported earnings (Skinner & Sloan, 2002).
Size of the board was negatively related to the corporate risk-taking, which is a
finding that goes against the conventional

wisdom that large boards have weaker

communication (Herman, 1981), worse participation of the members (Gladstein, 1984),
longer decision-making speeds (Kovner, 1985), worse board involvement levels (Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992b), decrease levels of monitoring and advising (Linck et al., 2008), and
provide weaker growth opportunities (Lehn et al., 2009). Data suggests that large boards
lead to lower corporate risk-taking. One reason for this finding may be the fact that larger
boards take longer to make decisions; so many risky decisions are postponed or never
made. Another explanation may be the fact that when you have a large group of people,
probability that someone has a low risk tolerance level in that group increases. One
person with a low risk-tolerance level in the group can block risky decisions and thus
lead to lower corporate risk-taking. Ownership of the stock by the board members did not
yield significant results in the model.
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Ratio o f insiders on the board was negatively correlated throughout board of
directors model and full model. The relationship was significant and negative for years
2008, 2009 and 2010. This finding suggests that larger number o f insiders actually
reduces corporate risk-taking. One possible explanation may be the fact that insiders
possess more knowledge about the company and so are able to make better decisions that
lead to reduction in corporate risk-taking. Another explanation may be the nature o f the
job security o f insiders. Job security o f insiders depends on the risk-level o f the
corporation where they work, so there is a direct incentive to make company safer, and
thus reduce corporate risk-taking.
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study adds to the discussion of corporate risk-taking behavior and asserts that
risk-taking by firms is due to multiple factors and we need to develop more complex
models to capture effects o f all the factors. Comprehensive approach used in this study
with different levels o f analysis, covering institutional environment or macro level, and
firm environment or

micro level showed that variables from both levels play into

corporate risk-taking and at different times effects o f those variables might have different
magnitude or change the directions. Theoretical contributions o f this work include
analyzing corporate risk-taking phenomena with multiple prisms and methods.
This study provides empirical evidence against the conventional notion
established in the media that current financial crisis was solely due to deregulation of
investment banking. In fact, findings suggest that deregulation had no immediate effect
on corporate risk-taking, but rather created an environment with many opportunities. That
environment full o f opportunities also had peer pressure. It was peer pressure o f other
investment banks and imitative behavior after “high status” banks that lead to aspirations
and eventually to excessive corporate risk-taking. Interestingly, aspirations based on
banks own past, were not contributing to the levels of corporate risk-taking.
Counterintuitive results were found for the size o f the boards of directors, which, while
bring many inefficiencies in decision making acts as a reducing factor for corporate risktaking.
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Path dependent knowledge of a particular industry or type of security, like CDOs,
according to the data had no effect on corporate risk-taking, while size o f the board of
directors had a pronounced effect. Results suggest that, while larger boards may be
ineffective and expensive to run, they lead to lower corporate risk-taking. This
dissertation also combined two types o f aspirations into one model, and empirical
evidence suggested that aspirations based on peers are more powerful predictors of
corporate risk-taking behavior than aspirations based on past performance. According to
data, both presence and duration of the presence o f specific knowledge o f real estate
securities that accumulates over time did not have effect on corporate risk-taking.
Overall, results support the idea that corporate risk-taking is a multidimensional
concept and needs to be studied from several perspectives.
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Thomson
Reuters
Thomson
Financial
Worldscope
Data for
20022011
Sources:
Thomson
Reuters
Thomson
Financial
Worldscope

Data for
20072010
Sources:
WRDS
Directors
Legacy

Behavioral Theory
of the Firm

X
X

Data for
1980-

Aspirations:
(3) Past Performance
(4) Industry Average

2011

H1-H12

Corporate
Risk-Taking
SDofFCF

Knowledge Based View
Diversification:
(5) Enthropy Measure
(6) Diversified REIT
(7) Time Diversified REIT

Agency Theory
Board of Directors
(8) Size of the Board
(9) Number of Interlocks
(10) Voting Power
(11) Stock Ownership
(12) Insiders Ratio

Figure 1. The model and data points.

Control Variables:
Size (In of Assets,
# of Employees)

Sources:
Thomson
Reuters
Thomson
Financial
Worldscope
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APPENDIX B

Organizational forms
according to souttural
contingency theory

Dynamic Capabilities
(Teece et al, 1997)

Emphasize

Related Terms

'Combinative capabilities'
(Kogut and Zander, 1992)

Conflict resolution skills

'Capabilities'
(Amlt and Sdioemaker, 1993)

five
factors

Use of real-time
information
Quantity of alternatives
considered
Presence of
experienced counselors
Degree of how decisions
are integrated

'Architectural Competence'
(Elsenhards and Martin. 2000)

’Continuous Morphing'
(Rlndova and Kotha, 2003}

Strategic decision making
(Elsenhardl, 1989)
Decision making speed
(Judge a Miller, 1991)
Product-development
(Dougherty, 1992)
Resource distribution practices
(Burgelman, 1994)
Internalizing knowledge
(Powell et at, 1998)
Imitation and brokering
(Hargadon 8 Sutton, 1997)

Internal

Knowledge generation
(Constance, 1997)
Reconfiguration of resources
(Hansen, 1999)

Competencies

Patching and re-stitching
(Eisenhardi & Brown, 1999)
Alliance building 8 acquisition
(Ranjay, 1999)
Measures to reunite networks
(Eisenhardt 8 Gabmjc, 2000)
Exit strategies
(Sull, 1999,2005)

Figure 2. Knowledge base and capabilities.

igh-level routines'
(Winter, 2003)

Routines
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APPENDIX C
Table 1. The list of 135 Publicly T raded Investm ent Banks in the L arge Sam ple

#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Entity Name
AB Watley Group Inc
Alliance Financial Corp.
Alliancebemstein Holding Limited Partne
Ameriprise Financial Inc
Arlington Asset Investment Corp.
Banctrust Financial Group Inc
Bank O f America Corp.
Bank O f Hawaii Corp.
Bank O f New York Mellon Corp.
Berkshire Hills Bancorp Inc
BGC Partners Inc
Blackrock Inc
Capital Financial Holdings Inc
Century Bancorp Inc
Charles Schwab Corp.
Chemung Financial Corp.
Cigna Corp.
Citigroup Inc
Citizens Republic Bancorp Inc
City Capital Corp.
City National Corp.
Cobiz Financial Inc
Comerica Inc
Commerce Bancshares Inc
Community Bank System Inc
Cowen Group Inc
Cross Timbers Royalty Trust
Crown Financial Holdings Inc
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc
Duff & Phelps Corp.
E* trade Financial Corp.

Quote Symbol
ABWG-5
ALNC-O
AB-N
AMP-N
AI-N
BTFG-O
BAC-N
BOH-N
BK-N
BHLB-O
BG CP-0
BLK-N
CPFH-U
CNBKA-0
SCHW-N
CHMG-U
CI-N
C-N
CRBC-0
CTCC-5
CYN-N
COBZ-O
CMA-N
CBSH-O
CBU-N
COWN-O
CRT-N
CFGI-5
CFR-N
DUF-N
ETFC-0
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32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Eastbridge Investment Group Corp.
Eastern Virginia Bankshares Inc
Edelman Financial Group Inc
Endovasc Inc
Evercore Partners Inc
FBR & Company
Federated Investors Inc
Fifth Third Bancorp
First Bancorp
First Busey Corp.
First Citizens Bancshares Inc
First Citizens Bancshares Inc
First Commonwealth Financial Corp
First Community Corp.
First Horizon National Corp.
First M & F Corp.
First Mid-Illinois Bancshares Inc
First Montauk Financial Corp.
First Niagara Financial Group Inc
Franklin Resources Inc
Fulton Financial Corp.
Fxcm Inc
Gain Capital Holdings Inc
Gamco Investors Inc
German American Bancorp Inc
GFI Group Inc
Gilman Ciocia Inc
Gleacher & Company Inc
Global Capital Partners Inc
Great Northern Iron Ore Properties
Greenhill & Company Inc
Heartland Financial USA Inc
Heritage Financial Group Inc
Huntington Bancshares Inc
Imperial Credit Industries Inc
Interactive Brokers Group Incorporation
Intercontinental Exchange Inc
International Fcstone Inc
Investment Technology Group

EBIG-U
EVBS-O
EF-O
EVSC-5
EVR-N
FBRC-0
FII-N
FITB-O
FBP-N
B U SE-0
FCNCA-O
FIZN-5
FCF-N
FCCO-O
FHN-N
FMFC-O
FMBH-U
FMFN-5
FNFG-O
BEN-N
FULT-O
FXCM-N
GCAP-N
GBL-N
GABC-O
GFIG-N
GTAX-5
GLCH-O
GCPL-5
GNI-N
GHL-N
H TLF-0
HBOS-O
HBAN-O
ICII-5
IBKR-O
ICE-N
IN TL-0
ITG-N
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71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Investors Capital Holdings Limited
Iron Mining Group Inc
Jacksonville Bancorp Inc
Janel World Trade Limited
Jefferies Group Inc
Jesup & Lamont Inc
JMP Group Inc
Jordan American Holdings Inc
JP Morgan Chase & Company
KBW Inc
Kent Financial Services Inc
Kentucky Bancshares Inc
Keycorp
KKR Financial Holdings LLC
Knight Capital Group Inc
Ladenburg Thalman Financial Services
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc
LPL Investment Holdings Inc
M & T Bank Corp.
Macatawa Bank Corp.
Marketaxess Holdings Inc
Merriman Holdings Inc
MF Global Holdings Limited
Morgan Stanley
Momingstar Inc
National Holdings Corp.
Network 1 Financial Group Inc
North State Bankcorp
Northern Trust Corp.
Oppenheimer Holdings Inc
Oregon Pacific Bancorp
Oriental Financial Group Inc
Paulson Capital Corp.
Penns Woods Bancorp Inc
Penson Worldwide Inc
Peoples Bancorp Inc
Peoples Bancorp Inc
Peoples United Financial Inc
Pinnacle Financial Partners Inc

ICH-A
IRNNQ-5
JXSB-O
JLWT-U
JEF-N
JLIC-5
JMP-N
JAHI-5
JPM-N
KBW-N
KENT-5
KTYB-U
KEY-N
KFN-N
KCG-N
LTS-A
LEHMQ-5
LPLA-O
MTB-N
MCBC-O
M KTX-0
MERR-5
MFGLQ-5
MS-N
MORN-O
NHLD-U
NTFL-U
NSBC-U
NTRS-O
OPY-N
ORPB-U
OFG-N
PLCC-O
PWOD-O
PNSN-O
PEBO-O
PEBC-5
PBCT-O
PNFP-O
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110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Piper Jaffray Companies
PNC Financial Services Group Inc
Potomac Bancshares Inc
Premier West Bancorp
Raymond James Financial Inc
Regions Financial Corp.
Rockville Financial Inc
Rodman & Renshaw Capital Group
SEI Investments Company
Siebert Financial Corp.
Southern Trust Securities Holding Corp.
Starinvest Group Inc
State Street Corp.
Stifel Financial Corp.
Suntrust Banks Inc
SWS Group Inc
SY Bancorp Inc
TCF Financial Corp.
TD Ameritrade Holding Corp.
The Goldman Sachs Group Incorporated
Tidelands Royalty Trust
Track Data Corp.
United Bancorp Inc Ohio
United Bankshares Inc
United Community Banks Inc
US Bancorp_______________

PJC-N
PNC-N
PTBS-U
PRWT-O
RJF-N
RF-N
RCKB-O
RODM-O
SEIC-0
SIEB-O
SOHL-U
STIY-5
STT-N
SF-N
STI-N
SWS-N
SYBT-O
TCB-N
AMTD-O
GS-N
TIRTZ-5
TRAC-5
UBCP-O
UBSI-O
UCBI-O
USB-N
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APPENDIX D

Table 2. The list of 42 Publicly T raded Investm ent Banks

#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Entity Name
Ameriprise Financial Inc
Bank O f America Corp.
Bank O f Hawaii Corp.
Bank O f New York Mellon Corp.
Charles Schwab Corp.
Cigna Corp.
City National Corp.
Comerica Inc
Commerce Bancshares Inc
Community Bank System Inc
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc
Fifth Third Bancorp
First Commonwealth Financial Corp
First Horizon National Corp.
First Niagara Financial Group Inc
Franklin Resources Inc
Fulton Financial Corp.
Greenhill & Company Inc
Huntington Bancshares Inc
Intercontinental Exchange Inc
Investment Technology Group
Jefferies Group Inc
JP Morgan Chase & Company
Keycorp
M & T Bank Corp.
Morgan Stanley
Northern Trust Corp.
Peoples United Financial Inc
Piper Jaffray Companies
PNC Financial Services Group Inc

Quote Symbol
AMP-N
BAC-N
BOH-N
BK-N
SCHW-N
CI-N
CYN-N
CMA-N
CBSH-0
CBU-N
CFR-N
FITB-O
FCF-N
FHN-N
FNFG-O
BEN-N
FULT-O
GHL-N
HBAN-0
ICE-N
ITG-N
JEF-N
JPM-N
KEY-N
MTB-N
MS-N
NTRS-O
PBCT-O
PJC-N
PNC-N
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31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Raymond James Financial Inc
Regions Financial Corp.
SEI Investments Company
State Street Corp.
Stifel Financial Corp.
Sun trust Banks Inc
SWS Group Inc
TCF Financial Corp.
The Goldman Sachs Group Incorporated
Track Data Corp.
United Bankshares Inc
US Bancorp

RJF-N
RF-N
SEIC-0
STT-N
SF-N
STI-N
SWS-N
TCB-N
GS-N
TRAC-5
UB SI-0
USB-N
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APPENDIX E
Table 3. ANOVA results

N

F

Sig.

Standard Deviation of Free Cash Flow

153

0.2680

0.6050

Standard Deviaiton of Earnings

153

1.0080

0.3150

Standard Deviation of Earnings Before Interest And Taxes

153

1.1480

0.2990

Standard Deviation of Earnings Before Taxes And
Depreciation

153

0.6370

0.8310
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APPENDIX F
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics o f the Board o f Directors Data

Min

Max

Mean

S.D.

Size of the Board

7

20

12.28

3.49

Number of Interlocks

0

31

12.11

8.84

0.00%

33.40%

8.47%

10.90%

Stock Ownership

0.12%

42.28%

6.89%

8.02%

Independent Ratio

44.00%

92.00%

74.02%

13.33%

Size of the Board

7

20

12.20

2.90

Number of Interlocks

1

26

10.80

7.16

0.00%

34.00%

. 5.32%

9.16%

Stock Ownership

0.15%

37.94%

5.72%

7.81%

Independent Ratio

44.44%

92.86%

75.85%

12.20%

Size of the Board

1

17

11.72

2.58

Number of Interlocks

0

25

9.51

6.41

0.00%

32.77%

5.14%

8.05%

Stock Ownership

0.16%

36.99%

5.44%

7.93%

Independent Ratio

50.00%

92.86%

75.21%

12.46%

Size of the Board

7

17

11.66

2.70

Number of Interlocks

0

24

8.61

6.38

0.00%

89.64%

6.66%

15.08%

Stock Ownership

0.16%

36.48%

5.19%

7.60%

Independent Ratio

50.00%

94.12%

76.18%

12.58%

Independent Variable

r~©

00
©

9

Voting Power

Voting Power

N

27

42

\

©

©
©

Voting Power

Voting Power

42

42

N = 153 observations, 42 boards of directors, four years
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APPENDIX G
Table S. Results o f the Regression on the Board o f Directors Data only

Independent Variable

N

Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011

R Square

0.1113

0.1734

Size ofthe Board

0.2814

-0.0339

0.1076

0.0730

0.3350

-0.6804

Stock Ownership

-0.2559

0.3689

Insiders Ratio

0.0159

-0.0592

o Number of Interlocks
o
M Voting Power

27

R Square

0.3200

Size of the Board
00 Number of Interlocks
©
oM
Voting Power

0.2418

-1.3516* -0.2919*

1.2817

0.4359

-0.2480

-0.4610

Stock Ownership

-0.3170

0.0694

Insiders Ratio

0.1284

-0.1316*

42

R Square

0.2903

Size ofthe Board
O Number oflnterbcks
O
M
Voting Power

-0.0261* -0.1995**

9s

42

Stock Ownership
Insiders Ratio
R Square

0.3315

0.5977

-0.1965

-0.4973

0.0658

0.0850

-0.2179*

-0.3172
0.3049

Size ofthe Board
O Number oflnterbcks
©
Voting Power

0.3294

0.3282

-0.0389* -0.0951*
42

Stock Ownership
Insiders Ratio
* p < .05; ** p < .01;
N = 153 observations, 42 boards of directors, four years

0.1744

0.2689

0.5933

-1.0771

-0.5961

0.7789

-0.4553**

0.4847
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APPENDIX H
Table 6. Results o f the Regression (Full Model)
Independent Variable

N

R Square
Aspirations Past Performance
Aspirations Industry Average
o Diversification Entropy
27/
o
Diversification into Diversified REIT
Years of Diversification into Diversified REIT
Size of the Board
Insiders Ratio
R Square
Aspirations Past Performance
Aspirations Industry Average
00 Diversification Entropy
©
t42
il
o
M
Diversification into Diversified REIT
Years of Diversification into Diversified REIT
Size of the Board
Insiders Ratio
R Square
Aspirations Past Performance
Aspirations Industry Average
0\
o Diversification Entropy
42
©
(N
Diversification into Diversified REIT
Years of Diversification into Diversified REIT
Size ofthe Board
Insiders Ratio
R Square
Aspirations Past Performance
Aspirations Industry Average
© Diversification Entropy
42
o
Diversification into Diversified REIT
Years ofDiversifieation into Diversified REIT
Size ofthe Board
Insiders Ratio
* p < .05; ** p < .01;
N =: 153 observations, 42 boards of directors, four years
it

Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011
0.1058
-1.7963
1.6991
-0.0593
0.2596
0.3032
0.0893
-0.0369

0.0976
-1.7018
1.5978
-0.1063
-0.0962
0.1061
0.1296
0.0562
0.1409
-0.0521
0.0782*
-0.1051
0.2963
0.0543
-0.0382*
-0.1775*

0.0843
-0.0348
0.0658
-0.1825*
0.1503
0.0774
-0.0343
-0.2430*
0.1821
0.1517
0.3123**
-0.1828
0.1243
0.0528
-0.0166*
-0.2469*

0.2341
0.1317
0.2615*
-0.2572*
0.0651
-0.0077
-0.1232
-0.3260*
0.1285
0.0237
-0.1108*
-0.1945
0.1437
0.0105
0.0997
-0.2500*

0.2044
0.6079
-0.8287
-0.2998*
0.0808
0.0407
0.7271
-1.5756*
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